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The Rise and Fall of
Plausibility Pleading?
Adam N. Steinman*
The Supreme Court's 2007 decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
and its 2009 decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal unleashed a torrent of scholarly
reaction. Commentatorscharged these decisions with adoptinga new pleading
regime, "plausibilitypleading," that upended the notice-pleadingapproachthat
had long prevailedin federal court. Whether a complaint could survive a motion
to dismiss-it was argued-now depends on whether the court found the
complaint plausible, allowing courts to second-guess a complaint'sallegations
without any opportunityfor discovery or considerationof actual evidence. Lower
courts began to cite Twombly and Iqbal at a remarkably high rate, and
empirical work revealed their effect on both dismissal rates and litigant
behavior.
Although Twombly and Iqbal were troublingon many levels, the rise of
a newly restrictiveform ofplausibilitypleading was not inevitable. There wasand still is-a path forward that would retain the notice-pleadingapproachset
forth in the text of the FederalRules themselves and confirmed by pre-Twombly
case law. This Article describes this reading of Twombly and Iqbal, and
explains how more recent Supreme Court pleadingdecisions are consistent with
this understanding.It is crucial, however, that these post-Iqbal decisions and
the approach to pleading they reflect receive the same attention that
accompanied Twombly, Iqbal, and the rise of plausibilitypleading. Otherwise
the narrative that Twombly and Iqbal compel a more restrictive pleading
standard may become further entrenched, compounding the adverse effects of
those problematic decisions.
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INTRODUCTION

With all apologies to T.S. Eliot, sometimes the world does end
with a bang.' At least, that's how it seemed after the Supreme Court

1.
T.S. ELIOT, THE HOLLOW MEN (1925) ("This is the way the world ends. Not with a bang
but a whimper.").
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3
decided Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 2 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.
According to the conventional wisdom, these decisions imposed a new
regime of plausibility pleading, discarding the notice-pleading approach
that-for more than half a century-allowed disputes to be resolved on
their merits after a meaningful opportunity for parties to uncover
relevant evidence. 4 Twombly and Iqbal unleashed a torrent of scholarly
reaction-largely critical-with many arguing that plausibility
federal
litigation,
fundamentally
recalibrated
pleading had
undermining access to justice and the private enforcement of
5
substantive law.
In more recent decisions on pleading standards, however, the
Supreme Court has applied Twombly and Iqbal in ways that confirm
and reinvigorate the simplified notice-pleading approach that the
Federal Rules' original drafters put into place. 6 This may come as a

550 U.S. 544 (2007).
2.
3.
556 U.S. 662 (2009).
See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing
4.
Systems, 95 IowAL. REV. 821, 825 (2010); Scott Dodson, New Pleading,New Discovery, 109 MICH.
L. REV. 53, 54 (2010); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 19 (2010) [hereinafter Miller, Double Play];
Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits:
Reflections on the Deformationof FederalProcedure,88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 331 (2013) [hereinafter
Miller, Deformation of Federal Procedure];Alexander A. Reinert, Screening Out Innovation: The
Merits of Meritless Litigation, 89 IND. L.J. 1191, 1207-08 (2014); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The
Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The DisparateImpact on Civil Rights and
Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 527 (2010); A. Benjamin Spencer,
Plausibility Pleading,49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 431-32 (2008); Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas 0. Main,
The Fourth Era of American Civil Procedure, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1839, 1848 (2014); Sheldon
Whitehouse, Restoring the Civil Jury's Role in the Structure of Our Government, 55 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1241, 1260 (2014); see also infra Part I.D (discussing other critiques).
5.
See supra note 4; see also David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical
Study of Civil Procedure,65 STAN. L. REV. 1203, 1204 (2013) ("Few developments in civil procedure
have caused anything like the furor that has greeted the Supreme Court's decisions in BellAtlantic
"); Louis Kaplow, Multistage Adjudication, 126 HARV.
Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal ..
L. REV. 1179, 1181 (2013) (noting that Twombly and Iqbal "generated intense reactions"). Not all
of the academic commentary was critical of plausibility pleading, however. See Andrew BlairStanek, Twombly Is the Logical Extension of the Mathews v. Eldridge Test to Discovery, 62 FLA. L.
REV. 1, 4 (2010) ("Twombly is not the radical departure alleged by Justice Stevens' dissent and by
a number of commentators, but rather is a logical progression in the Court's ever-expanding
application of the Matthews balancing test."); Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How
Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POLy 61, 64
(2007) (agreeing with the judgment in Twombly, but based on reasoning not expressed in the
majority opinion); Douglas G. Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 1063, 1064-65
(2009) (asserting that a plausibility standard is "an appropriate and necessary standard").
6.
For some early recognition that the Court's post-Iqbal pleading decisions reflect a more
lenient approach than the critiques of Twombly and Iqbal would suggest, see Richard D. Freer,
The Continuing Gloom About Federal JudicialRulemaking, 107 Nw. U. L. REV. 447, 465 (2013),
which states that Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521 (2011), and Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v.
Siracusano,563 U.S. 27 (2011), "may indicate that the sky is not falling"; and Adam N. Steinman,

336

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:2:333

surprise-presumably a welcome one-to the many critics of
plausibility pleading.7 But if one takes the reasoning of Twombly and
Iqbal seriously, there was indeed a path forward that would retain the
notice-pleading approach set forth in the text of the Federal Rules and
confirmed by pre-Twombly case law.8 That path was always the best
way to make sense of Twombly and Iqbal, and it appears to be the path
the Court itself has taken in more recent decisions. 9
This is not to defend Twombly and Iqbal. They were problematic,
result-driven decisions whose reasoning was-in many important
respects-incomplete, confusing, internally contradictory, or all of the
above. 10 Critics of Twombly and Iqbal expressed legitimate concerns
about where the logic of those decisions might lead. Indeed, empirical
studies suggest that Twombly and Iqbal have had a significant effect
on lower-court decisions and litigant behavior.1 1 But it does not follow
that lower courts have been correct to read and apply Twombly and
Iqbal the way that they have.
This Article uses the Court's more recent decisions, as well as
the logic of the Twombly and Iqbal decisions themselves, to challenge
the doctrinal misperceptions about Twombly and Iqbal that have
proven to be so influential among courts and commentators. Part I
begins by summarizing federal pleading standards from the adoption of
the Federal Rules in 1938 through seven decades of Supreme Court case
law enshrining the well-known notice-pleading approach. It then
describes Twombly and Iqbal and the initial reaction to those
controversial decisions.
Part II examines the majority opinions in Twombly and Iqbal
and argues that they did not impose a newly restrictive regime of
plausibility pleading. Taking those opinions at face value, their
approach to pleading did not make the viability of a complaint depend
To Say What the Law Is: Rules, Results, and the Dangers of Inferential Stare Decisis, 99 VA. L.
REV. 1737, 1763-65 (2013), which argues that Skinner and Matrixx are in tension with the view
that Twombly and Iqbal command a stricter approach to pleading. Skinner, Matrixx, and more
recent Supreme Court decisions are discussed infra Part III.
7.
Admittedly, the Supreme Court's recent track record does not inspire confidence when it
comes to procedural issues that affect individuals' ability to hold more powerful interests
accountable in federal court. See, e.g., Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How
Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431, 1470-72 (2013); Miller, Deformation
of FederalProcedure, supra note 4, at 310; Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on
AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 81-84, 91104, 161-68 (2011); A. Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure,78 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 353, 358-66 (2010); Subrin & Main, supra note 4, at 1869.
8.
See Adam N. Steinman, The PleadingProblem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1324-41 (2010).
9.
See infra Part III.
10. See infra notes 174-176 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 96-101 and accompanying text (describing empirical studies).
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on whether the court finds the claim "plausible," and it did not give
courts carte-blanche to second-guess a complaint's allegations at the
pleading phase. Although Twombly and Iqbal recognized that a court
need not accept as true mere "legal conclusions,"' 12 the ability to
disregard conclusory allegations should not allow courts to treat
complaints any more skeptically than they could under a noticepleading approach. The Federal Rules' text and structure remain
unchanged, and the Court has repeatedly indicated that to impose
stricter pleading standards would require an amendment to the Federal
Rules themselves. Indeed, Twombly quoted, cited, and endorsed several
of the Supreme Court's landmark notice-pleading cases, and it explicitly
embraced the "fair notice" standard that has been at the core of
13
Supreme Court's approach since Conley v. Gibson in 1957.14
Accordingly, not only is it possible to apply Twombly and Iqbal in a way
that preserves notice pleading, it is the best way to make sense of what
those decisions actually say.
Part III analyzes the Supreme Court's post-Iqbal pleading
decisions. Several cases during the last five years confirm the
understanding of Twombly and Iqbal described in Part II. Last Term,
for example, in Johnson v. City of Shelby, 15 the Court made clear that a
complaint passed muster as long as it "stated simply, concisely, and
directly events that, they alleged, entitled them to damages."'16 When
the Court's recent decisions have referred to plausibility, they have
done so in a way that-properly understood-reflects a legitimate
inquiry into the legal sufficiency of the plaintiffs claim. 7 These
decisions, therefore, refute two presumptions about how plausibility
pleading operates to heighten pleading standards in federal court. An
assessment of the complaint's factual "plausibility" is not the crucial
inquiry in deciding whether it survives a motion to dismiss. And courts
do not possess newfound power to second-guess a complaint's

12. See infra Sections I.B-C.
13. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
14. As explained infra, notes 63-65 and accompanying text, Twombly did "retire" one phrase
from Conley: the statement that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim
unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
which would entitle him to relief." Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46. However, Twombly disclaimed only
an extremely literal reading of that language and left its true meaning intact. See infra notes 6365, 126-141 and accompanying text.
15. 135 S. Ct. 346 (2014).
16. Id. at 347; see also id. ("Having informed the city of the factual basis for their complaint,
they were required to do no more to stave off threshold dismissal for want of an adequate statement
of their claim."). The Johnson decision is discussed in more detail infra Section 1I. E.
17. Johnson, for example, referred to whether a claim had "substantive plausibility." Id.
Other post-Iqbal Supreme Court decisions can also be understood in this way. See infra Part III.
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allegations before any opportunity to conduct discovery or to consider
actual evidence. To borrow a phrase from Twombly itself, the notion
that plausibility is the animating force behind the Court's recent
18
pleading jurisprudence has "earned its retirement."
Finally, Part IV confronts some important questions that courts
are likely to face going forward. Noting some continued uncertainty in
the lower federal courts, it proposes additional clarifications to ensure
that Twombly and Iqbal are properly aligned with a well-functioning
notice-pleading framework. It also addresses the role that potential
discovery burdens should-or more precisely should not-play when
considering motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
I. TWOMBLY, IQBAL, AND THE RISE OF "PLAUSIBILITY PLEADING"
This Part describes federal pleading standards beginning with
the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. It outlines
Supreme Court case law setting forth the well-known notice-pleading
approach, and then details the Court's decisions in Twombly and Iqbal.
It concludes by summarizing the initial reaction to Twombly and Iqbal
and the early impact of those decisions in the lower federal courts.
A. Pleading StandardsDuring the FederalRules'First Seven Decades
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, in
order to state a claim, a complaint need only provide "a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." 19
This pleading standard was a core feature of the Federal Rules when
they were initially adopted in 1938.20 It was meant to provide a simpler
approach than had traditionally been required under either commonlaw pleading or code pleading, in order to facilitate determinations of
21
cases on their merits.
18.
19.

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007).
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).

20.

Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, in 2 FED. RULES DECISIONS 456, 462 (1941)

("Simplified pleading is basic to any program of civil procedural reform .... That is the course of
the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure .... ").
21.
See Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, LitigationReform: An InstitutionalApproach,
162 U. PA. L. REV. 1543, 1584 (2014) ("In rejecting common law pleading ....
the drafters of the
1938 Federal Rules embraced the insights of legal realism. Pleadings are an inferior method to
find out what actually happened...."); Miller, Deformation of Federal Procedure,supra note 4, at
288-89:
[T]he distinguished proceduralists who drafted the Federal Rules believed in citizen
access to the courts and in the resolution of disputes on their merits, not by tricks or
traps or obfuscation .... Because the rulemakers were deeply steeped in the history of
the debilitating technicalities and rigidity that characterized the prior English and
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The Federal Rules illustrated this simpler approach with several
hypothetical complaints that were included in the Rules' appendix. One
of them provided that a negligence complaint would satisfy Rule 8 by
alleging: "On <Date>, at <Place>, the defendant negligently drove a
motor vehicle against the plaintiff. ' 22 A hypothetical patent
infringement complaint, using the example of electric motors, provided
that it would be sufficient to allege: "The defendant has infringed and
is still infringing the Letters Patent by making, selling, and using
23
electric motors that embody the patented invention."
Judge Charles Clark, the chief drafter of the original Federal
Rules, believed that these sample complaints were "the most important
part of the rules" as far as illustrating Rule 8's pleading standard.2 4 As
of December 1, 2015, the forms that had long appeared in the Federal
Rules' Appendix have been removed, and Rule 84-which had provided
the forms "suffice under these rules and illustrate the simplicity and
brevity that these rules contemplate" 25-has been abrogated. 26 The
Advisory Committee Note to this 2015 amendment states explicitly,
however, that the elimination of the forms "does not alter existing
American procedural systems-that is, the common law forms of action and then the
codes-the Rules established an easily satisfied pleading regime for stating a grievance
that abjured factual triviality, verbosity, and technicality.
Charles E. Clark-who was the chief drafter of the original rules as well as dean of the Yale Law
School and, later, a federal judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit-put it this
way: "[] n the case of a real dispute, there is no substitute anywhere for a trial. To attempt to make
the pleadings serve as such substitute is in very truth to make technical forms the mistress and
not the handmaid of justice." Charles E. Clark, The Handmaidof Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297,
319 (1938). For more on Clark's view of the proper role of pleading standards, see Charles E. Clark,
Pleading Under the FederalRules, 12 WYO. L.J. 177, 179-89, 191-93, 196-97 (1958) [hereinafter
Clark, Pleading Under the FederalRules]; Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading,
45 ARIZ.L. REV. 987, 990-94 (2003); and Michael E. Smith, Judge CharlesE. Clark and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 YALE L.J. 914, 917-19, 923-32 (1976).
2 (2014), reprinted infra Appendix B. Until 2007, this form
FED. R. Civ. P. Form 11,
22.
appeared as Form 9 and was drafted slightly differently. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 575-76
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting former Form 9: "On June 1, 1936, in a public highway called
Boylston Street in Boston, Massachusetts, defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against
plaintiff who was then crossing said highway."); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513
n.4 (2002) (same). The 2007 change occurred as part of a general restyling of the Federal Rules,
which was intended "to be stylistic only" and "to make no changes in substantive meaning." FED
R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee's notes to 2007 amendment.
23. See FED. R. CIV. P. Form 18, 3 (2014), reprinted infraAppendix B. This language derived
from Form 16 of the original rules, but became Form 18 in 2007.
24. Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, supra note 21, at 181:
What we require [in Rule 8] is a general statement of the case ....We do not require
detail. We require a general statement. How much? Well, the answer is made in what
I think is probably the most important part of the rules so far as this particular topic is
concerned, namely, the Forms.
25. FED. R. CIV. P. 84 (2014) (abrogated 2015).
26. FED. R. CIV. P. 84 advisory committee's notes to 2015 amendment.
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pleading standards or otherwise change the requirements of Civil Rule
8."27

For the Federal Rules' first seven decades, Supreme Court case
law elaborated on the simplified approach to pleading commanded by
the text of Rule 8 and these illustrative forms. In 1957, Conley v. Gibson
made clear that "the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require ,a
28
claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim."
Rather, a complaint is sufficient as long as it "give[s] the defendant fair
notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests."29 During the half-century that followed Conley, the Court
repeatedly quoted and applied the "fair notice" standard 3 0 -so much so
that the federal approach enshrined in Rule 8 came to be known as
"notice pleading." 31
This approach, the Court would later emphasize, was compelled
by the text of Rule 8 itself: "In Conley v. Gibson.... we said in effect
that the Rule meant what it said." 32 When presented with arguments
27. Id. As discussed in more detail infra note 163, long-standing forms such as the
complaints in Form 11 and Form 18 should continue to inform federal courts' approach to pleading
even though the Appendix of Forms has been deleted. Given their continued relevance-and
because such abrogated content may be harder to find as electronic sources of information are
updated to reflect the current Rules-several of the forms relevant to pleading standards are
reproduced in Appendix B of this Article.
28.
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (quoting Conley, 355
U.S. at 47); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S.
163, 168 (1993) (same).
31. E.g., Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511 (describing the federal approach as "a notice pleading
system"); Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168 (noting "the liberal system of'notice pleading' set up by the
Federal Rules"); Thomas v. Independence Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 295 (3d Cir. 2006) ("[T]he notice
pleading standard of Rule 8(a) applies in all civil actions, unless otherwise specified in the Federal
Rules or statutory law."); see also Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 669 (2005) (contrasting the Court's
approach to habeas corpus petitions with "the generous notice-pleading standard for the benefit of
ordinary civil plaintiffs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)"). It is worth noting that Charles
Clark himself had some reservations about framing the pleading standard in terms of notice; he
wrote:
The usual modern expression, at least of text writers, is to refer to the notice function
of pleadings .... This is a sound approach so far as it goes; but content must still be
given to the word "notice." It cannot be defined so literally as to mean all the details of
the parties' claims, or else the rule is no advance.
Clark, supra note 20, at 460 (emphasis added). For convenience, however, this Article will use the
phrase "notice pleading" to refer to the pleading standard that prevailed before Twombly, if only
because the Supreme Court itself has embraced that phrase. By contrast, the Court has still never
used the phrase "plausibility pleading"; a Westlaw search for that phrase in the Supreme Court
database returned zero cases.
32. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168:
Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint include only "a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." In Conley v. Gibson, . . . we said in
effect that the Rule meant what it said: "The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not
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that heightened pleading standards would be desirable for certain
kinds of issues in certain kinds of cases, the Court invariably responded
that such concerns-however justified as a practical matter-could not
be squared with the Federal Rules as they were written, and therefore
could only be implemented "by the process of amending the Federal
33
Rules, and not by judicial interpretation."
Indeed, the Court made one of its most robust reaffirmations of
notice pleading just five years before Twombly came down.
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A. 34 was an employment-discrimination case
decided in 2002. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Thomas,
the Court concluded that it was sufficient for a plaintiff to allege that
his "age and national origin were motivating factors in [the defendant's]
decision to terminate his employment." 35 Emphasizing Conley's "fair
notice" standard, 36 Justice Thomas made clear that the pleading
threshold did not require the plaintiff to show that he will ultimately
prevail on his claim, 37 or that he has or will likely uncover evidence to
support his allegations.3" Justice Thomas explicitly recognized that the
require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim. To the
contrary, all the Rules require is a short and plain statement of the claim that will give
the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests" (citations omitted).
33. E.g., Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 515 ("A requirement of greater specificity for particular
claims is a result that 'must be obtained by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by
judicial interpretation.'" (quoting Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168)); see also Subrin & Main, supra
note 4, at 1847 ("In 1993, and then again in 2002, the Supreme Court... found that only Congress
or other rulemakers-not the courts--could deviate from the 'notice pleading' standard required
by Federal Rule 8(a).").
34. 534 U.S. 506.
35. Amended Complaint at 37, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., No. 99 Civ. 12272 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 19, 2000), reprinted in Joint Appendix, 2001 WL 34093952, at 27a; see also Swierkiewicz, 534
U.S. at 514 ("Petitioner alleged that he had been terminated on account of his national origin in
violation of Title VII and on account of his age in violation of the ADEA.").
36. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512:
[I]mposing the Court of Appeals' heightened pleading standard in employment
discrimination cases conflicts with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), which
provides that a complaint must include only "a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Such a statement must simply "give the
defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests"
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
37. See id. at 515 ("[The federal] pleading standard [is] without regard to whether a claim
will succeed on the merits."); accord Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974):
When a federal court reviews the sufficiency of a complaint, before the reception of any
evidence either by affidavit or admissions, its task is necessarily a limited one. The
issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is
entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.
38. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511-12 (rejecting as "incongruous" with notice pleading a
requirement to allege facts raising an inference of discrimination, because "direct evidence of
discrimination" might be unearthed during discovery even though the plaintiff was concededly
"without direct evidence of discrimination at the time of his complaint").
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federal approach to pleading would "allowf lawsuits based on
conclusory allegations of discrimination to go forward." 39 But
"[w]hatever the practical merits of this argument, the Federal Rules do
not contain a heightened pleading standard for employment
40
discrimination suits."
Notice pleading was not a free pass, however. Even at the
pleading stage, a defendant could challenge a claim's legal sufficiency.41
If the substantive law does not provide a remedy for the conduct alleged,
the complaint's statement of the claim does not "shown that the pleader
is entitled to relief' as required by Rule 8(a)(2). 42 And such a complaint
"fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted," which justifies
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). 43 Indeed, a pleading-stage motion to
dismiss was-and remains-a suitable vehicle for resolving novel
questions of substantive law. 44 Notice pleading was also understood to
permit dismissal at the pleading stage when the plaintiffs own
allegations reveal a fatal defect that defeats the claim on the merits. In
other words, a plaintiff may "plead[] itself out of court" 45 by making

39. Id. at 514.
40. Id. at 514-15.
41.
See, e.g., Am. Postal Workers Union v. City of Memphis, 361 F.3d 898, 902 (6th Cir. 2004)
(reviewing a dismissal "based purely on the legal sufficiency of a plaintiffs case"); Browning v.
Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ("A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of a
complaint...."); Int'l Mktg., Ltd. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 192 F.3d 724, 732 (7th Cir. 1999):
[G]iven that the written agreements were, as a matter of law, the only valid agreements
between IML and the defendants, and given that IML by its own admissions apparently
failed to meet the payment terms that would have triggered the defendants' duty to
perform, neither ADM nor Swift acted wrongfully ....;
see also Clyde Spillenger, Teaching Twombly and Iqbal: Elements Analysis and the Ghost of
Charles Clark, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1740, 1745 (2013):
"[N]otice pleading" did not alter the requirement that the complaint's allegations satisfy
the elements of a recognized cause of action. The conceptual basis for assessing the legal
sufficiency of a complaint that had prevailed prior to the [Federal Rules'] adoption
remained in place: The complaint's allegations must be assessed in light of governing
substantive law to ensure that they address the elements of some recognized claim.
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
42.
43.
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
44. See generally, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) (on appeal from the district
court's denial of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, deciding whether the federal Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act violated the Establishment Clause); Rosenbrahn v. Daugaard, 61 F.
Supp. 3d 845 (D.S.D. 2014) (deciding in the context of defendants' motion to dismiss that South
Dakota's ban on same-sex marriage was unconstitutional); Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, 159 So. 3d 649
(Ala. 2014) (on certification from a federal district court in connection with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss, considering whether a name-brand drug manufacturer could be liable for failing to
warn a purchaser of the generic version); see also Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62,
65 (1990) (on appeal from a grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, deciding "whether promotion, transfer,
recall, and hiring decisions involving low-level public employees may be constitutionally based on
party affiliation and support").
45. Xechem, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 372 F.3d 899, 901 (7th Cir. 2004).

2016]

THE RISE AND FALL OFPLAUSIBILTY PLEADING?

343

allegations that conclusively undermine its claim for relief. If so, a Rule
46
12(b)(6) dismissal is proper.
B. Twombly
The genesis of what has come to be known as plausibility
pleading was the Supreme Court's 2007 decision in Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly. 47 Twombly was an antitrust class action alleging that
America's largest telecommunications firms-the "Baby Bells" or
"ILECs"-had violated § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act by engaging in
anticompetitive "parallel conduct." 48 The complaint alleged that they
had refused to compete against one another in their respective regional
markets, and had restrained other potential competitors (the non-Baby
49
Bells or "CLECs") who wished to access those markets.
For a plaintiff to obtain relief under § 1, the defendants'
anticompetitive behavior must have been pursuant to a "contract,
combination, or conspiracy." 50 As to this requirement, the crucial
allegation in the Twombly complaint was paragraph 51, which stated:
In the absence of any meaningful competition between the [ILECs] in one another's
markets, and in light of the parallel course of conduct that each engaged in to prevent
competition from CLECs within their respective local telephone and/or high speed
internet services markets and the other facts and market circumstances alleged above,
Plaintiffs allege upon information and belief that [the ILECs] have entered into a contract,
combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive entry in their respective local telephone
with one
and/or high speed internet services markets and have agreed not to compete
51
another and otherwise allocated customers and markets to one another.

By a vote of seven to two, the Supreme Court concluded that the
Twombly complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
46. See, e.g., Doe v. Smith, 429 F.3d 706, 708 (7th Cir. 2005) ("[L]itigants may plead
themselves out of court by alleging facts that defeat recovery."); Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors,
266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) ("We have held that a plaintiff can-as Sprewell has done hereplead himself out of a claim by including unnecessary details contrary to his claims."); Sparrow v.
United Air Lines, Inc. 216 F.3d 1111, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("In some cases, it is possible for a
plaintiff to plead too much: that is, to plead himself out of court by alleging facts that render
success on the merits impossible."); 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, MARY KAY
KANE, RICHARD L. MARcUS & ADAM N. STEINMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1215 (3d
ed. 2015) ("If a plaintiff does plead particulars, and they show he has no claim, then the plaintiff
has pleaded himself out of court.").
47.
550 U.S. 544 (2007).
48. Id. at 548-49; see also id. at 549 (defining "ILECs" as "Incumbent Local Exchange
Carriers").
49. See id. at 550-51; see also id. at 549 (defining "CLECs" as "competitive local exchange
carriers").
50. Id. at 548.
51. Id. at 551 (quoting Amended Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, at 51, Twombly v.
Bell Atlantic Corp., No. 02 CIV. 10220 (GEL) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2003), reprinted in Joint Appendix,
2006 WL 2472651, at 27) [hereinafter Twombly Complaint].
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Justice Souter's majority opinion recognized the allegation in
paragraph 51 that there had, in fact, been a "contract, combination, or
conspiracy," 52 but he found that "on fair reading these are merely legal
conclusions resting on the prior allegations" of parallel conduct.5 3
Accordingly, more was required to comply with federal pleading
standards. Justice Souter wrote that the complaint must contain
"allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)
agreement," 54 or-as he put it elsewhere in the opinion- "facts that are
55
suggestive enough to render a § 1 conspiracy plausible."
In applying this inquiry to the Twombly complaint, Justice
Souter concluded that the plaintiffs had "not nudged their claims across
the line from conceivable to plausible."5 6 He noted the plaintiffs'
allegations that the defendants had engaged in a "parallel course of
conduct" to restrain competition, such as by "making unfair
agreements" with CLECs wishing to access their networks; by
"providing inferior connections to the networks, overcharging, and
billing in ways designed to sabotage the CLECs' relations with their
own customers"; and by their "common failure meaningfully to pursue
attractive business opportunities in contiguous markets where they
possessed substantial competitive advantages." 57 Antitrust law,
however, does not forbid such parallel conduct if it is the product of each
actor's "independent decision" rather than "an agreement, tacit or
express," between competitors. 8 Justice Souter also observed that such
parallel conduct was consistent with "a wide swath of rational and
competitive business strategy unilaterally prompted by common
59
perceptions of the market."
What did the Twombly opinion say about prior Supreme Court
pleading decisions? Most significantly, it reaffirmed the basic noticepleading standard, explicitly endorsing Conley's command that Rule
8(a)(2) requires only that the complaint provide the defendant "fair
notice of what the.., claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." 60
Twombly also relied on Swierkiewicz, an exemplar of notice pleading

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

564 & n.9.
564.
557.
556.
570.
550-51 (internal quotation marks omitted).
553 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
553-54 (emphasis added).
555 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).

2016]

THE RISE AND FALL OFPLA USIBILTY PLEADING?

345

from just five years earlier. 61 Quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes-a 1970s
pleading case-Twombly made clear that "a well-pleaded complaint
may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those
facts is improbable, and 'that a recovery is very remote and unlikely."'62
Twombly did, however, take issue with one aspect of the halfcentury of Supreme Court pleading case law that preceded it. In Conley,
Justice Black had stated that "a complaint should not be dismissed for
failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him
to relief."6 3 In Twombly,64 Justice Souter wrote that this phrase had
"earned its retirement," insofar as it could be understood to preclude
dismissal "whenever the pleadings left open the possibility that a
plaintiff might later establish some set of undisclosed facts to support
65
recovery."
C. Iqbal
Ashcroft v. Iqbal was a case brought by a Pakistani man whom
federal officials had detained in New York City following the September
11th attacks. 66 Mr. Iqbal had been designated a "person 'of high
interest' in the September 11th investigation, and he alleged that he
had been held under harsh and highly restrictive conditions of
confinement at the Administrative Maximum Special Housing Unit
("ADMAX SHU") in Brooklyn. 67 Mr. Iqbal sought damages under
Bivens68 for a variety of constitutional violations against several
individual officials. 69 The only claims before the Supreme Court,
however, were Mr. Iqbal's claims against Attorney General John
Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller,7 0 which were based on a
theory that Ashcroft and Mueller had "adopted an unconstitutional
61. See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text (describing Swierkiewicz); see also
Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010) ("The Supreme Court's explicit
decision to reaffirm the validity of Swierkiewicz, which was cited with approval in Twombly.")
(citations omitted)).
62. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).
63. 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
64. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563.
65. Id. at 561 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). As discussed in more detail
in Section IIB, Twombly's treatment of Conley's "no set of facts" language did not constitute a
meaningful departure from notice pleading. Again, Twombly explicitly embraced Conley's "fair
notice" standard. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
66. 556 U.S. 662, 666-67 (2009).
67. Id. at 667-68.
68. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
69. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 667-68.
70. Id. at 668-69.
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of confinement on
policy that subjected [Iqbal] to harsh conditions
71
origin."
national
or
account of his race, religion,
The Court split five-to-four over whether Mr. Iqbal's complaint
adequately stated this claim. Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy
made clear that the Court's approach in Twombly had not been an
aberration. Rather, Twombly "was based on our interpretation and
application of Rule 8,"72 and therefore "expounded the pleading
standard for 'all civil actions.'73
With respect to Mr. Iqbal's substantive claims, Justice Kennedy
explained that-for purposes of a Bivens action-officials like Ashcroft
and Mueller "may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of
their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior."74 Thus, "a
plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through
75
the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution."
For a constitutional claim based on invidious discrimination, "the
plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant acted with
discriminatory purpose." 76 The defendant must act "because of, not
merely in spite of, [the action's] adverse effects upon an identifiable
group."77

The Iqbal majority then looked to the Twombly decision to
evaluate whether Mr. Iqbal's complaint was sufficient. Justice Kennedy
reasoned that "[tlwo working principles underlie our decision in
Twombly. 78 The first principle was this: "the tenet that a court must
accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is
inapplicable to legal conclusions." 79 In other words, "[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice."80 The second principle was that
"only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a
motion to dismiss."8 1 This second inquiry depended intimately on the

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
Feeney,
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 666.
Id. at 684.
Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1).
Id. at 676.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 677 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Personnel Admin. of Mass. v.
442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)).
Id. at 678.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 679.
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first. In assessing plausibility, the court must accept all nonconclusory
82
allegations as true.
Accordingly, the only way the Supreme Court could reject Mr.
Iqbal's claim was to dispose of any allegations in Mr. Iqbal's complaint
describing discriminatory conduct by Ashcroft and Mueller as
individuals. Paragraph 96 of Iqbal's complaint alleged that Ashcroft
and Mueller each "knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously
agreed to subject Plaintiffs to [harsh] conditions of confinement as a
matter of policy, solely on account of their religion, race, and/or national
origin and for no legitimate penological interest."8 3 And indeed, Justice
Kennedy found that this allegation was "conclusory and not entitled to
84
be assumed true."
Justice Kennedy then inquired whether other allegations in the
complaint-the remaining nonconclusory or "factual" allegationsplausibly suggested discriminatory conduct by Ashcroft or Mueller. The
two allegations he considered were (1) that "[i]n the months after
September 11, 2001, the Federal Bureau of Investigation ('FBI'), under
the direction of Defendant MUELLER, arrested and detained
thousands of Arab Muslim men ...

as part of its investigation of the

events of September 11"85; and (2) that "[tihe policy of holding postSeptember- 11th detainees in highly restrictive conditions of
confinement until they were 'cleared' by the FBI was approved by
Defendants ASHCROFT and MUELLER in discussions in the weeks
after September 11, 2001."'86
Just as the allegations of parallel conduct in Twombly were
deemed insufficient to plausibly suggest a prior agreement,8 7 these
insufficient to plausibly suggest
were deemed
allegations
discriminatory conduct by Ashcroft and Mueller. As for the large
numbers of Arab Muslim men detailed in the wake of 9/11, Justice
Kennedy reasoned that the attacks themselves "were perpetrated by 19
Arab Muslim hijackers who counted themselves members in good
standing of al Qaeda, an Islamic fundamentalist group [that] was
headed by another Arab Muslim-Osama bin Laden-and composed in

82. Id. ("When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their
veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." (emphasis
added)).
83. Id. at 680 (quoting Complaint at 17-18, Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, 2005 WL 2375202
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 04CV1809) [hereinafter Iqbal Complaint]).
84. Id. at 681.
85. Id. (quoting Iqbal Complaint, supranote 83, at 47).
86. Id. (quoting Iqbal Complaint, supranote 83, at 69).
87. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
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large part of his Arab Muslim disciples."8 8 Therefore, "[i]t should come
as no surprise that a legitimate policy directing law enforcement to
arrest and detain individuals because of their suspected link to the
attacks would produce a disparate, incidental impact on Arab
Muslims." 8 9 As for the role Ashcroft and Mueller played in adopting the
policy of holding post-September-11 detainees under restrictive
conditions until the FBI cleared them, Justice Kennedy responded that
the complaint "does not show, or even intimate, that petitioners
purposefully housed detainees in the ADMAX SHU due to their race,
religion, or national origin." 90
D. Reaction to Twombly and Iqbal
The reaction to Twombly-and then Iqbal--came swiftly.
Numerous commentators argued that the decisions had overturned
notice pleading in favor of a new, restrictive "plausibility pleading"
approach.9 1 It was often asserted that core notice-pleading precedentssuch as Swierkiewicz-had been implicitly overruled and were no
longer good law. 92 As a practical matter, Twombly and Iqbal threatened
88. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 683.
91.
See supranote 4; see also, e.g., Miller, Deformationof FederalProcedure,supra note 4, at
331 ("By demanding that the plaintiff plead facts demonstrating that the claim has substantive
plausibility, rather than a statement that is legally sufficient and gives notice of the plaintiffs
claim, [Twombly and Iqbal] represent a procedural 'sea change' in plaintiffs' ability to survive the
pleading stage."). But see Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting the
pre-Twombly understanding that "all that is necessary is that the claim for relief be stated with
brevity, conciseness, and clarity," that "a basic objective of the rules is to avoid civil cases turning
on technicalities and to require that the pleading discharge the function of giving the opposing
party fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the pleader's claim and a general indication
of the type of litigation that is involved," and arguing that Twombly and Iqbal do not "undermine[ ]
these broad principles"). For examples of scholarly attempts to understand Twombly and Iqbal in
ways that are less disruptive to pre-Twombly precedent, see Edward A. Hartnett, Taming
Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (2010); David L. Noll, The Indeterminacy of
Iqbal, 99 GEO. L.J. 117 (2010); Steinman, supra note 8.
92. See, e.g., Suja A. Thomas, Oddball Iqbal and Twombly and Employment Discrimination,
2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 226 (2011) ("Swierkiewicz is effectively dead after Iqbal and Twombly.");
Sheldon Whitehouse, Opening Address, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1517, 1521 (2014) ("Iqbal and
Twombly... implicitly overruled precedents, such as Swierkiewicz."); see also Brown v. Castleton
State College, 663 F. Supp. 2d 392, 403 n.8 (D. Vt. 2009) ("Swierkiewicz itself has a questionable
status after Twombly . . . and especially after Iqbal."). In Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d
203 (3d Cir. 2009), the court suggested that Swierkiewicz had been "repudiated," but it then used
classic notice-pleading reasoning to conclude that a disability-discrimination claim was adequately
pled. See Steinman, supra note 8, at 1322 n.167, 1343 n.290, 1343, 1345 nn.300-04 (discussing
Fowler). Just recently, a panel of the Fourth Circuit divided sharply over the continued vitality of
Swierkiewicz. Compare McCleary-Evans v. Maryland Dept. of Trans., 780 F.3d 582, 587 (2015)
(noting that Swierkiewicz had "applied a pleading standard more relaxed than the plausible-claim
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access to justice and the private enforcement of substantive law by
authorizing courts to dismiss complaints they find implausible before
93
the plaintiff has had any opportunity to invoke the discovery process.
Iqbal's clarification that a federal court could refuse to accept as true
"conclusory" allegations added another dimension to this critique; how
could a plaintiff who had no access to information in the defendant's
possession provide the sort of nonconclusory allegations Iqbal would
require? Twombly and Iqbal, it was argued, created a "Catch-22"9 4plaintiffs would need court-supervised discovery in order to obtain the
information needed to get past the pleading phase, but they could not
95
invoke the discovery process unless they survived the pleading phase.
Twombly and Iqbal also prompted scholars to examine the
empirical impact of those decisions.9 6 There is some disagreement
standard required by Iqbal and Twombly"), with id. at 589-90 (Wynn, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the majority improperly "ignore[d] the factual underpinnings of the Swierkiewicz holding, looking
solely to the Supreme Court's 2009 decision in Iqbal to guide its decision," and noting that lower
federal courts "have no authority to overrule a Supreme Court decision no matter how out of touch
with the Supreme Court's current thinking the decision seems").
93. See supranote 4.
94. See Dodson, supra note 4, at 68 ("[Tjhe plaintiff is trapped in a Catch-22: she may have
a meritorious claim, but, because critical facts are not obtainable through informal means, she
cannot plead her claims with sufficient factual detail to survive a motion to dismiss under the New
Pleading standard of Twombly and Iqbal."); Miller, Double Play, supra note 4, at 42-43 (arguing
that "something of a Catch-22" could arise in "actions in which factual sufficiency is most difficult
to achieve at the pleading stage" because such cases "have been particularly vulnerable to the
demands of Twombly and Iqbal" even though "these are the very cases that should be given greater
pleading latitude"); see also Steinman, supra note 8, at 1352 (noting that heightened pleading
standards can place plaintiffs "in the Catch-22 of needing court-supervised discovery to uncover
the factual and evidentiary details that would be required to get past the pleadings phase to
discovery").
95. See supra note 94; see also Stephen B. Burbank, Pleadingand the Dilemmas of Modern
American Procedure, 93 JUDICATURE 109, 118 (2009) ("Perhaps the most troublesome possible
consequence of Twombly and Iqbal is that it will deny access to court to plaintiffs and prospective
plaintiffs with meritorious claims who cannot satisfy their requirements either because they lack
the resources to engage in extensive pre-filing investigation or because of informational
asymmetries.").
96. See, e.g., Christina Boyd, David Hoffman, Zoran Obradovic & Kosta Ristovski, Building
a Taxonomy of Litigation: Clusters of Causes of Action in Federal Complaints, 10 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 253 (2013); Jonah B. Gelbach, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects
of Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270, 2338 (2012) [hereinafter,
Gelbach, Locking the Doors]; Lonny Hoffman, Twombly and Iqbal's Measure:An Assessment of the
Federal Judicial Center's Study of Motions to Dismiss, 6 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1 (2011); William H. J.
Hubbard, Testing For Change In Procedural Standards, With Application To Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 35 (2013); Patricia W. Hatamyar Moore, An Updated Quantitative
Study of Iqbal's Impact on 12(b)(6) Motions, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 603 (2012); Alexander A. Reinert,
The Costs of Heightened Pleading,86 IND. L.J. 119 (2011); Alexander A. Reinert, Measvring the
Impact of Plausibility Pleading,101 VA. L. REV. 2117 (2015) [hereinafter Reinert, Measuring the
Impact]; Joe S. Cecil, Of Waves and Water: A Response to Comments on the FJC Study Motions to
Dismiss for Failureto State a Claim after Iqbal (Mar. 19, 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2026103
[http://perma.cc/VRS7-YRJU]; Joe S. Cecil, George W. Cort, Margaret S. Williams & Jared J.
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among the various studies, 97 but many found that Twombly and Iqbal
increased the likelihood that motions to dismiss would be granted (at
least for particular kinds of cases). 98 There were also significant
selection effects; 99 parties were opting not to file in federal court at all,
concerned that the lawsuit would founder on the rocks of Twombly and
Iqbal.100 As for the lawsuits that were filed, federal courts invoked
Twombly and Iqbal at an astounding rate-the two decisions quickly
joined the ranks of the most frequently cited Supreme Court opinions
in history.' 0 1
The critiques of Twombly and Iqbal raise valid concerns, and the
practical effects of these decisions are troubling. As a normative matter,
any pleading standard that imposes unnecessary obstacles to
potentially meritorious claims deserves criticism, especially when the
federal rules governing the discovery process explicitly allow litigants
both to protect themselves from unduly burdensome discovery requests
and to obtain information from their opponents beyond what is alleged
in the pleadings. 10 2 One question that went largely unexplored,
however, was whether Twombly and Iqbal-as a doctrinal mattershould have been read to mandate a newly restrictive approach to
pleading.
Bataillon, Fed. Judicial Ctr., Motions to Dismiss for Failureto State a Claim After Iqbal: Report to
the Judicial Conf. Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules (2011); Joe S. Cecil, George W. Cort, Margaret
S. Williams & Jared J. Bataillon & Jacqueline G. Campbell, Fed. Judicial Ctr., Update on
Resolution of Rule 12(b)(6) Motions Granted with Leave to Amend: Report to the Judicial
Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (2011). See generally Engstrom, supra note 5
(discussing some of the empirical studies on the effect of Twombly and Iqbal); Jonah B. Gelbach,
Can the Dark Arts of the Dismal Science Shed Light on the EmpiricalReality of Civil Procedure?,
2 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 223 (2014) [hereinafter Gelbach, Dark Arts] (same).
97. Compare, e.g., Hubbard, supra note 96, at 57:
I find fairly precise zeros for the effects of Twombly on both the grant rate of MTDs and
the overall rate of dismissals among filed cases. These results support the view
that Twombly effected no (significant) change in the willingness of courts to dismiss
cases, even after accounting for selection effects.,
with Gelbach, Dark Arts, supra note 96, at 233 n.51, 234 (arguing that Hubbard's study fails to
account for party selection effects).
98. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 96, at 12; Moore, supra note 96, at 603; Reinert, Measuring
the Impact, supra note 96, at 2145.
99. See Gelbach, Locking the Doors, supra note 96, at 2306-07; Boyd et al., supra note 96, at
254.
100. See Gelbach, Locking the Doors, supra note 96, at 2306-07.
101. A list of the 100 most frequently cited Supreme Court decisions appears infra in
Appendix A. According to the Shepard's citation service, Twombly and Iqbal already rank third
and fourth in terms of citations by federal court opinions.
102. See infra notes 298-306 and accompanying text; see also Steinman, supranote 8, at 1353
(noting that the Federal Rules already "allow judges to restrict discovery where its costs are likely
to exceed its benefits" and arguing that "[t]his more nuanced approach avoids the sledgehammer
of dismissal at the pleadings phase, which denies all access to discovery, in favor of allowing courts
to mitigate discovery's costs while preserving its potential benefits").
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II. RECONCILING TWOMBLYAND IQBAL WITH NOTICE PLEADING
This Part examines the Court's reasoning in Twombly and Iqbal
and the pleading framework they employ. Although the decisions are
problematic in many respects, their approach to pleading can and
should be reconciled with the notice-pleading approach that
characterized federal practice for nearly seven decades. Section A
proposes a basic understanding of the Twomblyllqbal two-step analysis,
and shows how that approach can be applied consistently with notice
pleading. Section B examines Twombly's "retirement" of the Supreme
Court's statement in Conley that "a complaint should not be dismissed
for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief,"103 and explains why Twombly's critique of Conley
does not constitute a meaningful departure from notice pleading.
Section C elaborates on what should constitute a "conclusory" allegation
whose truth need not be accepted at the pleading phase.
A. Iqbal's Two Steps
To reconcile the logic of Twombly and Iqbal with notice pleading,
one must consider carefully the two-step analysis Justice Kennedy
described in Iqbal. That analysis proceeds as follows: First, the court
must identify allegations that are mere "legal conclusions" and
disregard them for purposes of determining whether the complaint
states a claim for relief. 10 4 Second, the court must assess whether the
remaining allegations, accepted as true, plausibly suggest an
entitlement to relief. 10 5 Under this framework, the real potential for
mischief lies in the ability to disregard conclusory allegations. Only the
first-step examination of "legal conclusions" can excise allegations from
a complaint. The second-step "plausibility" inquiry allows a complaint
to pass muster even if a substantive requirement of the plaintiffs claim
10 6
is stated only in conclusory terms.
Accordingly, calling the Twombly and Iqbal framework
"plausibility pleading" is a significant over-simplification. Under the
103. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
104. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also supra notes 78-80 and accompanying
text (describing this part of the Iqbal opinion).
105. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also supranotes 81-82 and accompanying text (describing this
part of the Iqbal opinion).
106. See Steinman, supra note 8, at 1319 ("Conclusoriness is destructive; it justifies
disregarding an allegation. Plausibility is generative; it justifies creating an allegation that is not
validly made in the complaint itself (perhaps because it was alleged only in a conclusory
manner).").
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logic of Twombly and Iqbal, there is no need to assess plausibility if the
nonconclusory allegations establish all of the requirements of a
meritorious claim. Twombly recognized this, noting that an
"independent" allegation of an agreement between the Baby Bell
defendants would have sufficed. 10 7 And Iqbal recognized this, noting
that it was paragraph 96's "conclusory nature"-not the fact that it was
"chimerical" or "fanciful"-that allowed the Court to refuse to accept its
truth. 108 As long as a complaint's nonconclusory allegations, accepted as
true, establish a claim for relief, the complaint necessarily passes
muster. To allow courts to second-guess such allegations under the
guise of "plausibility" would contravene the requirement that
nonconclusory allegations must be accepted as true at the pleading
phase.109
What about Iqbal's recognition that courts may refuse to accept
the truth of conclusory allegations? One might argue that even to
recognize that possibility is to impose a more restrictive pleading
standard than had existed prior to Twombly and Iqbal. Well before
Twombly and Iqbal, however, federal appellate courts had embraced
the idea that a court was not required to accept mere legal
conclusions. 110 Indeed, the power to disregard legal conclusions flows
quite naturally from the core fair-notice requirement. If a complaint
provides-in the language of Iqbal-merely an "unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation,"' '
or "a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action,"112 it has not provided
"fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which
113
it rests."
107. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007).
108. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681. Justice Kennedy also made clear that "[wiere we required to
accept [paragraph 96] as true, respondent's complaint would survive petitioners' motion to
dismiss." Id. at 686.
109. Put another way, "when a complaint contains nonconclusory allegations on every
element of a claim for relief, the plausibility issue vanishes completely," because "the court must
assume the veracity of such nonconclusory allegations." Steinman, supra note 8, at 1316 (citation
omitted). "If such allegations address each element that would be needed to ultimately prove the
plaintiffs claim, then they do more than make an entitlement to relief plausible-they confirm an
entitlement to relief, at least for purposes of the pleadings phase." Id. at 1316-17 (citation omitted).
110. See, e.g., Achtman v. Kerby, McInerney & Squire, LLP, 464 F.3d 328, 337 (2d Cir. 2006)
("[Clonclusory allegations or legal conclusions ... will not suffice to defeat a motion to dismiss."
(citation omitted)); Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969,973 (9th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he court
is not required to accept legal conclusions .... " (citation omitted)).
111. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 ("[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require
'detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfullyharmed-me accusation." (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)).
112. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
113. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). Indeed, one might perfectly align Twombly and
Iqbal with notice pleading simply be defining the term "conclusory" to mean "failing to provide fair
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The biggest challenge going forward from Twombly and Iqbal is
to determine what qualifies as a conclusory allegation whose truth may
be disregarded at the pleading phase. This inquiry is what makes
Twombly and Iqbal so potentially disruptive to notice pleading, but it is
also the key to saving notice pleading. One way to reconcile the
Twombly/Iqbal framework with notice pleading would be with the
following approach: an allegation qualifies as "conclusory"-and hence
fails to provide "fair notice"-when it states a mere legal conclusion
11 4
rather than identifying a real-world act or event.
This approach should not cause alarm for proponents of notice
pleading. Suppose, for example, that a complaint alleges merely: "the
defendant violated the plaintiffs legal rights in a way that entitles the
plaintiff to relief'; or "the defendant violated the plaintiffs rights under
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act"; or "the defendant breached a
duty owed to the plaintiff under state law and this breach proximately
caused damages to the plaintiff." These allegations would all state a
claim for relief, in the sense that the plaintiff would prevail if these
allegations were ultimately proven true. Yet even notice pleading would
require something more. Why? Because they do not identify what
actually occurred in the real world: What did the defendant do? What
happened to the plaintiff? These hypothetical allegations epitomize the
"unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation,"1 15 or
the "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,"1 1 6 that
can be disregarded as conclusory. One might call this a transactional
approach to pleading-it is the failure to provide an adequate
transactional narrative that permits the court to refuse to accept such
allegations as true.

notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Under the two-step
framework set forth in Iqbal, the only basis for refusing to accept an allegation as true is that it is
conclusory. See supra notes 78-82, 106-109 and accompanying text (summarizing Iqbal and
emphasizing that the nonconclusory allegations must be accepted as true). If "conclusory" means
nothing more than "failing to provide fair notice," the conflict with notice pleading disappears. See
Steinman, supra note 8, at 1324-25 ("Iqbal's recognition that conclusory allegations need not be
accepted as true does not necessarily mean the end of notice pleading. It merely cloaks the notice
inquiry in different doctrinal garb."); id. at 1325 ("To say that an allegation is 'conclusory' because
it lacks X is no different than saying that 'fair notice' requires the defendant to be informed of X.").
114. See Steinman, supranote 8, at 1334:
One way to reconcile Twombly and Iqbal with authoritative pre-Twombly texts and
precedents is to define 'conclusory' in transactional terms. A plaintiffs complaint must
provide an adequate transactional narrative, that is, an identification of the real-world
acts or events underlying the plaintiffs claim. When an allegation fails to concretely
identify what is alleged to have happened, that allegation is conclusory and need not be
accepted as true at the pleadings phase.
115. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
116. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
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I will elaborate in more detail below on how this transactional
approach fits with the Supreme Court's reasoning in Twombly and
Iqbal.117 For now, it is important to note that this approach does not
require a court to inquire how a plaintiff will ultimately prove her
version of what happened, or to assess the likelihood that the plaintiff
will ultimately succeed. The plaintiff need only provide allegations
regarding the events underlying her claim. It thus avoids the
informational "Catch-22" associated with a restrictive understanding of
plausibility pleading. As long as the plaintiff can articulate a
transactional narrative that, if true, would entitle her to relief, she can
use the discovery process to uncover evidence to support that
transactional narrative.
What about plausibility-the second step in the Twombly/Iqbal
framework? The plausibility inquiry might perform a number of
functions that do not invite the troubling consequences that would flow
from a more restrictive reading of those decisions. First, as Twombly
and Iqbal both indicate, plausibility could allow courts to infer things
that were not themselves alleged in the complaint--or that were alleged
purely in a conclusory manner. Many have criticized the Supreme
Court's reasoning regarding how a court should decide whether certain
allegations do "plausibly suggest" some missing requirement of a viable
cause of action.11 8 These critiques are well taken, but it is crucial to
recognize that a plaintiff need not rely on "plausibl[e] suggest[ions]" if
the complaint's nonconclusory allegations, accepted as true, establish a

117. See infra Section II.C (elaborating on how "conceptualiz[ing] what counts as 'conclusory'
in transactional terms . . . reconcile[s] the Court's conclusions in Twombly and Iqbal with preTwombly notice-pleading precedents"); see also Steinman, supra note 8, at 1298-99, 1328-39
(describing the transactional approach).
118. See, e.g., Miller, Deformation of FederalProcedure,supra note 4, at 334:
[Twombly] requires facts-not conclusions-"showing" (a word in the Rule never
previously judicially focused on or accorded any significance) a "plausible" claim, with
little guidance as to what that means. And what does it mean? Justice Souter's
Twombly opinion only tells us plausibility is something more than purely speculative
or possible, but it can be less than probable. Of course, that's not very helpful.
(footnotes omitted); Burbank, supra note 95, at 118 (criticizing "[t]he lqbal Court's reliance on
'judicial experience and common sense'" as "an invitation to 'cognitive illiberalism'" (citing Dan
M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v.
Harris and the Perilsof Cognitive Illiberalism,122 HARV. L. REV. 838 (2009)). Additional confusion
regarding plausibility stems from seemingly contradictory language on the relationship between
plausibility and the likelihood of uncovering supporting evidence during discovery. On one hand,
Twombly stated that "when a complaint adequately states a claim, it may not be dismissed based
on a district court's assessment that the plaintiff will fail to find evidentiary support for his
allegations." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8. On the other hand, it stated that the plausibility
inquiry "calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence
of illegal agreement." Id. at 556. This tension is discussed infra note 297.
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meritorious claim. 1 9 As a logical matter, the potential for the
plausibility inquiry to salvage complaints where the requirements of a
meritorious claim are addressed only by conclusory allegations makes
the pleading framework more forgiving, not less. 120 Again, it is only the
ability to disregard conclusory allegations that allows courts to secondguess the truth of a complaint's allegations.
Second, plausibility can encompass the sort of legal-sufficiency
inquiries that have long been an accepted aspect of notice pleading. '21
Even if a complaint describes with unquestionable clarity the events
that are the basis for the plaintiffs cause of action, it should not survive
the pleading phase if those events would fail, as a matter of law, to
justify any relief for the plaintiff. It would correctly be said that the
complaint does not "statefl a plausible claim for relief."122 One subset of
this scenario is where the plaintiff has "pled itself out of court" by
including allegations that conclusively undermine a viable claim. 123 In
this situation, the plaintiffs own allegations would confirm that the
124
complaint does not "state[] a plausible claim for relief."
125
Under this view of the plausibility inquiry, plausibility plays
no role when a complaint's nonconclusory allegations, accepted as true,
establish a claim for relief. Because those nonconclusory allegations
must be accepted as true, such a complaint necessarily would survive
the plausibility inquiry. The complaint must be examined as if all of
those nonconclusory allegations have been proven. If those
nonconclusory allegations make out a meritorious claim, there is no role
for a free-floating assessment of those allegations' "plausibility."
B. Whither Conley?
One of the principal arguments that Twombly and Iqbal should
be read to abrogate notice pleading is captured by the vastly oversimplified sound bite that Twombly overruled Conley. As discussed
above, Twombly did "retiren" Conley's statement that "a complaint
should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of

119.
120.
121.
122.
claim for
123.
124.
125.

See supranotes 104-109 and accompanying text.
See Steinman, supra note 8, at 1319.
See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) ("[Olnly a complaint that states a plausible
relief survives a motion to dismiss.").
See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
See supra notes 106-109 and accompanying text.
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his claim which would entitle him to relief."1 26 This is the only aspect of
notice-pleading case law that either decision challenged explicitly. Yet
for the reasons that follow, Twombly's treatment of this single sentence
in Conley does not constitute a meaningful departure from noticepleading precedent.
As an initial mater, Twombly did not undermine Conley's fairnotice standard-Twombly explicitly embraced it.127 And even with
respect to Conley's "beyond doubt. . . no set of facts" language, Twombly
"retir[ed]" only a nonsensically literal understanding of that phraseone that would preclude dismissal "whenever the pleadings left open
the possibility that a plaintiff might later establish some set of
undisclosed facts to support recovery." 128 This was not what Conley
meant, of course. If one were to adopt such a straw man interpretation
of this language, then a complaint could survive if it alleged nothing
more than "the planet Earth is round."1 29 From that allegation alone, it
would not "appearU beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Any
number of actionable facts are consistent with the Earth being round.
A round planet might play host to contractual breaches, interference
with property rights, negligently-caused automobile collisions,
infringement of patents for electric motors, constitutional violationsthe list goes on. The "Earth is round" allegation would certainly "le[ave]
open the possibility that a plaintiff might later establish some set of
undisclosed facts to support recovery. 13 °
Consider also a complaint alleging only that "I was an employee
of the defendant and the defendant terminated my employment." Even
if that allegation is accepted as true, it does not state a meritorious
claim for relief. Yet that allegation also does not make it "appear[]
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
his claim which would entitle him to relief." The termination might
have breached a contract, violated the employee's First Amendment
rights, or run afoul of federal prohibitions on discrimination based on
race, gender, age, religion, or national origin. Again, such an allegation
would "le[ave] open the possibility that a plaintiff might later establish
13 1
some set of undisclosed facts to support recovery."

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
Id. at 561, 563 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).
Steinman, supra note 8, at 1321.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
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Therefore, it is not at all inconsistent with notice pleading for
Twombly to have rejected this one sentence from Conley insofar as that
sentence would preclude dismissal "whenever the pleadings left open
the possibility that a plaintiff might later establish some set of
undisclosed facts to support recovery. '"132 What, then, was Conley's nowretired "no set of facts" phrase meant to achieve? Properly understood,
that language merely confirmed that speculation about the provability
of a claim typically is not an appropriate inquiry at the pleading phase;
provability is relevant only when it "appears 'beyond doubt' that the
133
plaintiff cannot prove her claim.
Twombly did not undermine this notion. Twombly, in fact, said
much the same thing: "a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it
strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and
that a recovery is very remote and unlikely." 134 As for what makes a
complaint "well-pleaded," Conley and Twombly provide identical
answers: "[A]ll the Rules require is 'a short and plain statement of the
claim' that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs
135
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."
It should also be recognized that some of the most frequently
quoted passages from Conley did not paint the full picture of how notice
pleading operated in practice. As discussed above, Conley's "no set of
13 facts" language would lead to ridiculous results if taken literally 6
although that phrase was subject to a much more sensible
interpretation than Twombly acknowledged. 137 Even Conley's "fair
notice" language is partially incomplete, insofar as it overlooks the
possibility that a complaint could fail on legal-sufficiency grounds. That
is, it is not necessarily true that "all the Rules require is 'a short and
plain statement of the claim' that will give the defendant fair notice of
138 If
what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."

132. Id.
133. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957); see also Steinman, supra note 8, at 1321. ("[T]his
now-discredited phrase was subject to a far more sensible reading.").
134. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
135. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47; accord Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 ("Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a)(2) requires only 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the... claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.'" (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47)).
136. See supra notes 128-131 and accompanying text (demonstrating the problems with an
overly literal interpretation of this language from Conley).
137. See supra notes 133-135 and accompanying text.
138. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47; accord Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 ("Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a)(2) requires only 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.'" (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47)).
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that "statement of the claim" reveals that the claim would fail as a
matter of law, it can and should be subject to dismissal at the pleading
phase. Properly understood, Twombly and Iqbal's plausibility inquiry
139
operationalizes the legal-sufficiency inquiry-as discussed above.
Accordingly, Twombly's one point of departure with Conley does
not reject any meaningful aspect of the pre-Twombly pleading regimeespecially when so much of that regime is reaffirmed and cited
approvingly by the Twombly opinion itself. 140 Iqbal also did not question
any aspect of the Court's notice-pleading precedent. Justice Kennedy
framed the Court's approach to pleading in Iqbal as nothing more, and
nothing less, than the Twombly approach. 4 1 If Twombly and Iqbal
discarded notice pleading, they did not do so explicitly. 142
C. Twombly, Iqbal, and the Power to DisregardConclusory Allegations
For all of the reasons explained earlier, Twombly and Iqbal's
most significant potential impact lies in courts' ability to disregard
allegations in a complaint on the grounds that they state only "legal
conclusions."'' 4 3 Because Iqbal itself recognizes that nonconclusory
allegations must be accepted as true, a court may second-guess a
complaint's allegation only if it finds that the allegation is conclusory. I
argue here that as long as the complaint's allegations identify the basic
events that establish the plaintiffs entitlement to relief, those
allegations are nonconclusory-the plaintiff should not be required to
include allegations indicating how it will prove those allegations.
Admittedly, the Twombly and Iqbal decisions themselves fail to
provide concrete guidance on what makes an allegation impermissibly
"conclusory." One reason for this difficulty is that the Court does not
reconcile its refusal to accept some allegations in those cases with its
willingness to accept others. 144 In Iqbal, for example, the Court deemed
it sufficiently nonconclusory to allege that "[i]n the months after
September 11, 2001, the Federal Bureau of Investigation ('FBI'), under
139. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text (discussing Twombly's endorsement of
Conley and other notice-pleading precedents).
141. As discussed above, the Iqbal opinion viewed Twombly as "expound[ing]" Rule 8's
pleading standard for all civil actions. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
142. This is significant because, as discussed infra notes 153-155 and accompanying text, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed that lower courts should not infer that earlier Supreme
Court decisions have been implicitly overruled.
143. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
144. See Steinman, supra note 6, at 1758 (noting "the [Iqbal] majority's conclusion (also
without explanation) that other allegations in the Iqbal complaint were 'factual' and hence entitled
to an assumption of truth").
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the direction of Defendant MUELLER, arrested and detained
thousands of Arab Muslim men. . as part of its investigation of the
events of September 11,"' 145 and that "[tihe policy of holding postSeptember-1 ith detainees in highly restrictive conditions of
confinement until they were cleared by the FBI was approved by
Defendants ASHCROFT and MUELLER in discussions in the weeks
after September 11, 2001."'146 If there is a principle that explains why
these allegations must be accepted as true but the allegation in
147
paragraph 96 does not, the Court does not explain what it is.
In deciding how best to navigate this terrain, it is significant
that neither Twombly nor Iqbal overrule Swierkiewicz or any other
aspect of pre-Twombly pleading except for Conley's "beyond doubt...
no set of facts" language. 148 As discussed above, Twombly took issue
only with an extremely literal reading of that phrase. 149 The preTwombly notice-pleading framework did not depend on the contorted
reading of Conley that Twombly correctly retired. 150 That Twombly took
pains to challenge that one particular reading of one particular phrase
in Conley buttresses the view that other tenets of the long-standing
notice-pleading framework should remain intact. Again, Twombly
embraced Conley's "fair notice" standard. 151 It would be perverse to read
Iqbal as implicitly rejecting that standard when its analysis was based
152
on the Twombly decision that had explicitly reaffirmed "fair notice."
Moreover, the Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed that its
decisions should not be read to overrule earlier decisions implicitly.
Only the Supreme Court has the "prerogative of overruling its own
decisions." 153 Until the Court itself has done so, lower courts continue
to be bound by those prior decisions. 154 Caution seems especially
145. Iqbal Complaint, supra note 83, at 47; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681 (quoting the
complaint).
146. See Iqbal Complaint, supra note 83, at 69; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681 (quoting the
complaint).
147. See Steinman, supra note 8, at 1329 (comparing the allegations that the Court
disregarded in Iqbal with the ones that the Court accepted as true).
148. See supra notes 60-135 and accompanying text.
149. Supra notes 126-133 and accompanying text; see also Steinman, supra note 6, at 1757
("Twombly jettisoned only a very problematic, borderline-nonsensical understanding of this phrase
.. . . 11).

150. See Steinman, supra note 6, at 1757 ("No serious jurist had ever read Conley as imposing
).
such a meaningless standard ....
151. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
152. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
153. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
154. See id. at 238 (emphasizing that lower courts are bound to follow Supreme Court holdings
"unless and until [the Supreme] Court reinterpreted the binding precedent"); see also Scheiber v.

360

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:2:333

warranted where, as here, the later decisions cite and reaffirm the
155
earlier decisions that they have supposedly overruled.
The approach proposed earlier-which would conceptualize
what counts as "conclusory" in transactional terms' 5 6 -is able to
reconcile the Court's conclusions in Twombly and Iqbal with preTwombly notice-pleading precedents. 157 First, consider paragraph 51 of
the Twombly complaint:
In the absence of any meaningful competition between the [defendants] in one another's
markets, and in light of the parallel course of conduct that each engaged in to prevent
competition from CLECs within their respective local telephone and/or high speed
internet services markets and the other facts and market circumstances alleged above,
Plaintiffs allege upon information and belief that Defendants have entered into a contract,
combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive entry in their respective local telephone
and/or high speed internet services markets and have agreed not to compete with one
another and otherwise allocated customers and markets to one another.iii

As a logical matter, an agreement to engage in parallel conduct
must come before the parallel conduct itself. Yet paragraph 51 suggests
that the conspiracy derives from the parallel conduct, rather than the
other way around. The Twombly majority emphasized precisely this
fact in finding that while "a few stray statements [in the complaint]
speak directly of agreement, on fair reading these are merely legal
conclusions resting on the prior allegations." 159 Accordingly, Justice
Dolby Labs., Inc., 293 F.3d 1014, 1018 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.) ("[W]e have no authority to
overrule a Supreme Court decision no matter.
how out of touch with the Supreme Court's
current thinking the decision seems.").
155. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 113-117 and accompanying text.
157. It may be worth interrogating the presumption that the Supreme Court's ultimate
conclusion on a particular issue-such as whether paragraph 51 of the Twombly complaint or
paragraph 96 of the Iqbal complaint should be accepted as true at the pleading phase-generates
obligations on future courts as a matter of stare decisis. See Steinman, supra note 6, at 1742
(examining whether stare decisis should "requir[e] future courts to infer obligations from the mere
results of cases"). As explained above, neither Twombly nor Iqbal provided any clarifying principle
that would require courts to disregard allegations that would have passed muster for purposes of
notice pleading. If stare decisis requires courts to read Twombly and Iqbal as creating broader
authority to disregard allegations at the pleading phase, then courts are-by necessity-being
forced to infer from those bare results new principles that the precedent-setting decisions never
themselves articulated. See id. at 1783-90. Although result-based stare decisis may foster
consistency in a very loose sense, it carries with it the risk that courts will be required to read
decisions far more sweepingly than is justified. See id. at 1742. For these reasons, I have argued
elsewhere that-as a matter of institutional design-a better approach to stare decisis would not
require courts to justify, reconcile, or explain the bare results reached by superior courts. Id. at
1783-86.
158. Twombly Complaint, supra note 51, at 1 51.
159. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 564-66 (explaining that "the complaint first takes account of the
alleged absence of any meaningful competition between the ILECs in one another's markets, the
parallel course of conduct that each ILEC engaged in to prevent competition from CLECs, and the
other facts and market circumstances alleged earlier" and that "'in light of' these, the complaint
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Souter concluded that the Twombly plaintiffs had merely "rest[ed] their
§ I claim on descriptions of parallel conduct and not on any independent
16
allegation of actual agreement among the ILECs." 0
Now consider the key paragraph of the Iqbal complaint.
Paragraph 96 alleged that Ashcroft, Muller, and nine other defendants
"each knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject
Plaintiffs to [harsh] conditions of confinement as a matter of policy,
solely on account of their religion, race, and/or national origin. 16 1 The
problem with this paragraph is not necessarily the allegation that
Ashcroft and Mueller acted "solely on account of [Iqbal's] religion, race,
and or national origin." If it were, Iqbal would indeed be hard to square
with Swierkiewicz (where the complaint contained a similarly cursory
allegation regarding the defendant's intent),16 2 as well as former Form
11 (which states without elaboration that the defendant was driving
"negligently"). 163

concludes that the ILECs have entered into a contract, combination or conspiracy to prevent
competitive entry into their markets and have agreed not to compete with one another." (emphasis
51) (other quotation marks and
added)) (quoting Twombly Complaint, supra note 51, at
alterations omitted)).
160. Id. at 564 (emphasis added). One can certainly take issue with the Court's reading of
paragraph 51. The placement and phrasing of that paragraph could have been an attempt to
indicate, consistent with Rule 11, "that the conspiracy allegation was one that did not currently
have evidentiary support but 'will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity
for further investigation or discovery.'" Steinman, supra note 8, at 1338-39 (quoting FED. R. CiV.
P. 11(b)(3)). For the Twombly plaintiffs, it is unfortunate that the Court failed to consider this
possibility. But the fact remains that the Twombly majority's concern with paragraph 51 was that
it did not constitute an "independent allegation of actual agreement" but rather a mere "legal
conclusion[ ] resting on the prior allegations." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 564 (emphasis added). Had
the complaint provided such an "independent allegation of actual agreement," it would have-in
the language of Iqbal--qualified as a nonconclusory allegation that must be accepted as true.
161. Iqbal Complaint, supra note 83, at 96.
162. See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text (describing Swierkiewicz).
163. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (describing Form 11). The 2015 amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure eliminated nearly all of the Forms that had appeared in
the Federal Rules' Appendix, including all of the sample complaints. See supra notes 22-27 and
accompanying text (describing the sample complaint for negligence and the sample complaint for
patent infringement). The Advisory Committee Note makes clear, however, that the elimination
of the forms "does not alter existing pleading standards or otherwise change the requirements of
Civil Rule 8." FED. R. CIv. P. 84, advisory committee note. Indeed, the impetus for eliminating the
forms confirms that no substantive change to the Federal Rules is intended; rather, the committee
note explains that the Forms "are no longer necessary" because "[t]he purpose of providing
illustrations for the rules, although useful when the rules were adopted, has been fulfilled." Id. As
an interpretive matter, it would be nonsensical to use the fact that the Forms' "purpose" has been
"fulfilled" as justification for an approach to pleading (or any other topic governed by the Federal
Rules) that flies in the face of those same Forms. Given the explicit instruction in the proposed
committee note, and the fact that no amendments were made to the rules that govern pleading
and pleading motions (such as Rule 8 and Rule 12), pleading forms that have occupied the Federal
Rules for its first eight decades remain the best indicator of the pleading framework contemplated
by the drafters, and they should continue to be followed unless and until the Court commands a
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But there is another way to understand what made paragraph
96 conclusory. It failed to state what Ashcroft and Mueller actually did
vis-&-vis Iqbal. Given the Court's understanding of what was required
for Bivens liability-that "each Government-official defendant, through
1 64
the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution" Ashcroft's and Mueller's individual conduct was crucial as a matter of
substantive law. Yet up until this key allegation in the Iqbal complaint,
Ashcroft's and Mueller's role in Iqbal's confinement seemed to be solely
their approval of the hold-until-cleared policy. This policy was never
alleged to have been adopted for invidious reasons-a point that Justice
Kennedy made explicitly in his opinion. 165 Insofar as paragraph 96 did
not allege that discriminatory animus drove Ashcroft and Mueller to
take any particular, concrete, real-world action, one might legitimately
conclude that-at least as to Ashcroft and Mueller-the allegation in
paragraph 96 is "nothing more than a 'formulaic recitation of the
66
elements' of a constitutional discrimination claim."'
A proper application of Iqbal could yield a different outcome,
therefore, if a hypothetical complaint alleged:
Ashcroft and Mueller ordered that all post-September-lth detainees who are Arab or
Pakistani Muslim men be subjected to harsh conditions of confinement, and they issued
this order because of its adverse effect on this particular group. Iqbal was subjected to
harsh conditions of confinement pursuant to this policy.

Or perhaps:
Ashcroft and Mueller knew Iqbal personally and they ordered that he be subjected to
harsh conditions of confinement because he was a Pakistani Muslim man.

In both instances, the allegation of the defendants' state of mind is no
less cursory than in Iqbal itself.167 But these hypothetical allegations
state more than mere legal conclusions because they describeadmittedly in "short and plain" fashion 16 8 -what actions Ashcroft and

different approach. Several of the forms relevant to pleading standards are reproduced in
Appendix B of this Article.
164. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S 662, 676 (2009).
165. Id. at 683.
166. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
167. See Steinman, supra note 8, at 1341 (arguing that under a proper understanding of Iqbal,
"an allegation may contain some language that, in isolation, might be characterized as conclusory
without the allegation being deemed 'conclusory' for purposes of Iqbal step one").
168. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief' (emphasis added)).
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Mueller took. 169 Therefore, they should be accepted as true without any
assessment of their "plausibility."' 7 0
This approach also makes sense of Swierkiewicz and the sample
negligence complaint (former Form 11)171 that occupied the Rules'
Appendix for nearly eight decades. Although Swierkiewicz-like
Iqbal-involved a defendant's discriminatory intent, the Swierkiewicz
complaint provided a straightforward transactional narrative: the
plaintiff was employed by the defendant, and the plaintiff was fired
because of his age (fifty-three) and national origin (Hungarian). Former
Form 11 also concretely identified the liability-generating conduct and
172
event: the defendant negligently driving his car against the plaintiff.
This is more than the sort of "unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfullyharmed-me accusation" that Iqbal declared should be disregarded as a
mere legal conclusion, even though it does not elaborate on precisely
173
how the defendant was negligent.
D. Saving Twombly and Iqbal from Themselves?
The argument that Twombly and Iqbal can be reconciled with
notice pleading is not an attempt to defend those decisions. The Court
gave little meaningful guidance as to crucial aspects of pleading
doctrine and how that doctrine commanded the results in Twombly and
Iqbal.174 Although the newly-constituted "plausibility" inquiry can be
contextualized in a way that does not disrupt the federal court's long169. This approach, therefore, makes sense of Rule 9(b)'s command that "[malice, intent,
knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind may be alleged generally." FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
Yet it also explains why the mere ability to allege intent or state of mind "generally" does not mean
that every such allegation passes muster. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 686-87 ("Rule 9 merely excuses a
party from pleading discriminatory intent under an elevated pleading standard. It does not give
him license to evade the less rigid-though still operative-strictures of Rule 8."). The allegation
must still be sufficiently tethered to an adequately identified transaction in order to be accepted
as true at the pleading phase. See id. at 687 ("Rule 8 does not empower respondent to plead the
bare elements of his cause of action, affix the label 'general allegation,' and expect his complaint
to survive a motion to dismiss.").
170. As discussed above, plausibility could nonetheless play a role if the complaint contained
other allegations that were fatal to the plaintiffs claims, or if the substantive law were such that
not even discriminatory animus would entitle a plaintiff to Bivens damages. See supranotes 121124 and accompanying text. But those kinds of legal-sufficiency arguments have always been
proper at the pleading phase. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (describing Form 11).
172. Form 11 remains instructive regarding pleading standards notwithstanding the recent
elimination of the Federal Rules' Appendix. See supra note 163.
173. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 ("As the Court held in Twombly, the pleading standard Rule 8
announces does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed- me accusation." (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007))).
174. See supra notes 144-147, 160 and accompanying text.
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standing notice-pleading approach, 175 it was ill-advised to create from
thin air a concept that lends itself to such confusion and
consternation. 176
To avoid any misunderstanding, it is worth clarifying where the
arguments in this Article do-and do not-depart from the standard
critique of Twombly and Iqbal. It is admittedly a bit of a misnomer to
say there is a "standard" critique given the vast literature on these
decisions. But at the risk of oversimplifying, one tends to find the
following features:
*
•
*

Point #1: Twombly and Iqbal impose a more restrictive pleading
standard.
Point #2: Lower courts have taken a more restrictive approach
to pleading following Twombly and Iqbal.
Point #3: A more restrictive pleading standard is normatively
undesirable.

If one accepts all of these points, it follows that lower courts are
correct to take a more restrictive approach to pleading (Point #2); they
are, after all, simply following the binding precedent from the Supreme
Court (Point #1). Adherents to the standard critique, therefore, would
necessarily accept that this restrictive approach to pleading can be
corrected only by the Supreme Court explicitly overruling Twombly and
Iqbal or by an amendment of the Federal Rules themselves, either
through the Rules Enabling Act process or by direct congressional
legislation. None of these seem particularly likely to occur. Accordingly,
the standard critique operates to entrench a restrictive approach to
177
pleading that is normatively undesirable (Point #3).
My arguments part ways with the standard critique only with
respect to Point #1. I argue that Twombly and Iqbal should not be read
to impose a more restrictive pleading standard. Of course people may
legitimately disagree over the correct interpretation of Twombly and
Iqbal, just as people may disagree over the correct interpretation of
statutes or constitutional provisions. 178 But this is an interpretive
question with normative dimensions: how should these decisions be

175. See supra Section II.A.
176. See Steinman, supra note 8,at 1299 ("[I]t was irresponsible for the Court to invite the
controversial 'plausibility' concept into pleading doctrine in a way that has led to such widespread
confusion.").
177. See id. at 1296-97 ("The current discourse.., threatens to make Iqbal's (and Twombly's)
effect on pleading standards a self-fulfilling prophecy.").
178. See Steinman, supra note 6, at 1738,1767-75 (comparing interpretation of case law with
interpretation of statutes).
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interpreted? Point #1 of the standard critique, therefore, cannot be
established simply by Point #2, unless we are to accept that lower
courts' interpretations of Supreme Court precedent are always correct.
When one combines the interpretive argument presented here
with the other aspects of the standard critique, the points are as follows:
*
*
"

Point #1: Twombly and Iqbal do not impose a more restrictive
pleading standard.
Point #2: Lower courts have taken a more restrictive approach
to pleading following Twombly and Iqbal.
Point #3: A more restrictive pleading standard is normatively
undesirable.

If one accepts Point #1-that Twombly and Iqbal do not impose
a more restrictive approach to pleading and that the core aspects of the
pre-Twombly, notice-pleading approach remain good law-then lower
federal courts are wrong to take a more restrictive approach to pleading
(Point #2). And there are, therefore, more options for avoiding the
normatively undesirable consequences of a more restrictive pleading
standard (Point #3). Litigants can make the interpretive argument set
out in this Article without waiting for a textual revision of the Federal
Rules or a grand declaration from the Supreme Court overruling
Twombly and Iqbal. While many critiques of Twombly and Iqbal reduce
the options for avoiding a more restrictive approach to pleading going
forward, the arguments set out in this Article increase those options.
Indeed, a fair reading of Twombly and Iqbal-despite their
many faults-suggests caution before presuming an intent to overhaul
federal pleading standards. 179 If there were five votes to abandon notice
pleading, or to overrule Swierkiewicz or other core precedents from the
pre-Twombly era, nothing would have stopped the Court from doing
so.' 8 0 For those who question the normative desirability of a more
179. What may have united the majorities in Twombly and !qbal was not a desire to make
pleading standards more restrictive, but rather an outcome-driven hostility to the particular
claims being asserted in those cases. See Steinman, supra note 8, at 1299 ("At best, Twombly and
Iqbal appear to be result-oriented decisions designed to terminate at the earliest possible stage
lawsuits that struck the majorities as undesirable."); id. at 1326 (arguing that "the precise facts of
Twombly and Iqbar' may have motivated the majorities in those cases, rather than a "broader
doctrinal agenda" regarding pleading standards).
180. See id. at 1326 ("[The Court] was perfectly willing to retire Conley v. Gibson's 'no set of
facts' language .... That the Court did not similarly retire either Swierkiewicz or Conley's 'fair
notice' principle speaks volumes."). The conventional reaction to Twombly and Iqbal may, in fact,
have enabled those Justices who do favor a broader dismantling of federal pleading standards to
have their cake and eat it too. They did not have to say they were overruling core aspects of the
federal approach to pleading-they likely lacked the votes to do so. But the presumption that there
was no other way to apply Twombly and Iqbal going forward allowed them to accomplish that
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restrictive pleading standard, the worst possible outcome would be for
courts to read Twombly and Iqbal as wreaking havoc on the simple,
merits-driven approach to pleading conceived of by the original drafters
of the Federal Rules.1 8 1 That alternative is troubling not only because
of its impact on access to justice and the enforcement of substantive
rights and obligations, but also because-as discussed above-it is
contrary to so many other aspects of the Twombly and Iqbal decisions
themselves. The "fair notice" test is still good law.1 8 2 Swierkiewicz is
still good law.18 3 And it is still the case that "a well-pleaded complaint
may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those
18 4
facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely."
To be sure, there were aspects of the Twombly and Iqbal
majority opinions that courts could point to as justifying greater
hurdles at the pleading phase, if they were so inclined. Empirical
studies suggest that many lower courts have been doing just that.18 5 It
does not follow, however, that those courts are reading Twombly and
Iqbal correctly. For all the reasons set out above, a careful reading of
result all the same. See id. at 1296-97 ('The current discourse ... threatens to make Iqbal's (and
Twombly's) effect on pleading standards a self-fulfilling prophecy.").
181. To accept the approach to pleading urged here, one need not necessarily agree with the
Supreme Court's findings that the core allegations in the Twombly and Iqbal complaints should
indeed have been disregarded as conclusory. See Steinman, supra note 8, at 1344-45 ("One could
reasonably disagree with the Court's holdings that the crucial allegations in Twombly and Iqbal
were conclusory."). Although there are some ways in which those allegations are less-than-ideal
from a transactional standpoint, see supranotes 158-160, 164-170 and accompanying text, one
could sensibly conclude otherwise. But if the Court's findings that those allegations were
conclusory place constraints on future courts in terms of how the post-Iqbal pleading framework
is to be applied, but cf. supra note 157 (questioning whether a court's ultimate findings, as opposed
to the legal principles than generate such findings, should create binding obligations on future
courts as a matter of stare decisis), a transactional approach can make sense of those decisions
without implicitly overhauling core features of notice pleading.
182. See supra notes 60, 127, 135 and accompanying text; see also Hamilton v. Palm, 621 F.3d
816, 817 (8th Cir. 2010) ("Twombly and Iqbal did not abrogate the notice pleading standard of Rule
8(a)(2)."); Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting that Twombly had not
"repudiated the general notice-pleading regime of Rule 8" and that "[t]his continues to be the case
after Iqbal."); Carter v. Ford Motor Co., 561 F.3d 562, 565-66 (6th Cir. 2009) ("The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his
claim. To the contrary, all the Rules require is a short and plain statement of the claim that will
give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Anderson v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev.,
554 F.3d 525, 528 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly for the proposition that "the complaint must
give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." (ellipses
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
183. See supra notes 61-62, 153-155 and accompanying text; see also Swanson v. Citibank,
N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting "[tihe Supreme Court's explicit decision to reaffirm
the validity of Swierkiewicz, which was cited with approval in Twombly) (citations omitted)).
184. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416
U.S. 232, 236).
185. See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.

2016]

THE RISE AND FALL OF PLA USIBILTY PLEADING?

367

Twombly and Iqbal not only permits, but compels them to be applied in
a manner that preserves the preexisting notice-pleading framework. As
the next Part will show, the Supreme Court's post-Iqbal pleading
decisions are consistent with this understanding.
1II. THE SUPREME COURT'S POST-IQBAL PLEADING DECISIONS
For the reasons described in Part II, the best reading of Twombly
and Iqbal does not impose on the federal judiciary a new plausibilitypleading regime. The framework developed in Twombly and Iqbal does
not, in fact, make an assessment of the complaint's "plausibility" the
crucial inquiry in deciding whether it survives a motion to dismiss. Nor
do Twombly and Iqbal compel a more restrictive pleading standard
than the notice-pleading framework that existed in pre-Twombly years.
We now have the benefit of additional input from the Supreme Court,
which has addressed federal pleading standards on numerous occasions
during the last five years. This Part will describe the six most
significant post-Iqbal Supreme Court decisions that address pleading
standards.
A. Skinner v. Switzer
It took almost two years for the Court to revisit pleading
standards following Iqbal. Then, in the spring of 2011, the Court
decided Skinner v.Switzer, 8 6 which involved a prisoner's § 1983 action
18 7
seeking to obtain DNA testing as a matter of procedural due process.
Writing for a six-Justice majority-and citing two core pre-Twombly
precedents on pleading standards--Justice Ginsburg explained:
Because this case was resolved on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the
question below was not whether Skinner will ultimately prevail on his procedural due
process claim, see Scheuer v.Rhodes, but whether his complaint was sufficient to cross
the federal court's threshold, see Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.188

The Court recognized that "Skinner's complaint is not a model
of the careful drafter's art, but under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, a complaint need not pin plaintiffs claim for relief to a
precise legal theory. Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
generally requires only a plausible 'short and plain' statement of the
plaintiffs claim."1 9 Skinner's complaint included allegations that he
186.
187.
188.
416 U.S.
189.

131 S. Ct. 1289 (2011).
Id. at 1293.
Id. at 1296 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes,
232, 236 (1974); and Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002)).
Id.
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had twice requested and failed to obtain DNA testing under the only
state-law procedure then available to him, 190 that he had persistently
sought the State's voluntary testing of the materials he identified, 19 1
and that the State had refused "to release the biological evidence for
testing," thereby depriving him "of his liberty interests in utilizing state
procedures to obtain reversal of his conviction and/or to obtain a pardon
192
or reduction of his sentence."
Ultimately, the Court did not take up the legal "vitality" of
Skinner's claim, because the only issues before it were (1) whether
federal subject-matter jurisdiction was foreclosed by the RookerFeldman doctrine, and (2) whether § 1983 was an appropriate vehicle
for Skinner's claim.' 93 What is significant in terms of pleading
standards, however, is that the Court accepted as true Skinner's
allegations regarding both his and the State's behavior without regard
to whether those particular allegations were "plausible," and without
insisting on additional allegations suggesting the truth of those
allegations. The Court even cited Swierkiewicz as authoritative on
"whether his complaint was sufficient to cross the federal court's
threshold."1 94 According to the Supreme Court itself, then, reports of
195
Swierkiewicz's death were greatly exaggerated.
B. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano
Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano96 was a securities fraud
case in which the Court unanimously held that the plaintiffs had
190. Id. (citing Complaint at 14-20; and Skinner v. Switzer 131 S. Ct. 1289 (2011) (No.2:09cv-00281-J-BB) 2010 WL 2937563 at *5).
191. Id. (citing Complaint at 22-31; and Skinner 131 S. Ct. 1289 (No.2:09-cv-00281-J-BB)
2010 WL 2937563 at *5).
192. Id. (citing Complaint at 33; and Skinner 131 S. Ct. 1289 (No.2:09-cv-00281-J-BB) 2010
WL 2937563 at *5).
193. See id. at 1297:
The merits of Skinner's federal-court complaint assailing the Texas statute as
authoritatively construed, and particularly the vitality of his claim in light of [District
Attorney's Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 (2009)], are not ripe
for review. We take up here only the questions whether there is federal-court subjectmatter jurisdiction over Skinner's complaint, and whether the claim he presses is
cognizable under § 1983.... Respondent Switzer asserts that Skinner's challenge is
jurisdictionally barred by what has come to be known as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
194. Id. at 1296; see supra note 188 and accompanying text.
195. This phrase is often attributed to Mark Twain, responding to a prematurely published
obituary. See Rucker v. United States, 382 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1296 (D. Utah 2005) (Cassell, J.)
("Mark Twain observed in 1897 that 'the reports of my death are greatly exaggerated'...."). Other
sources describe a slightly different quotation. See OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 512 (2014)
(describing Twain's June 2, 1897 statement to the New York Journal that "[t]he report of my death
was an exaggeration").
196. 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011).
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adequately pled that the defendant's misrepresentations were material
for purposes of federal securities law. 197 According to the plaintiffs,
Matrixx had made material misrepresentations by withholding
information suggesting a connection between its product, the cold
remedy Zicam, and a risk of anosmia (the loss of smell). 9 8 The
defendant first argued that it had not made any material
misrepresentations because the various studies and other information
it knew of at the time did not establish a statistically significant risk of
anosmia. Justice Sotomayor's opinion for the Court rejected that view,
emphasizing that the legal test for materiality was whether the
withheld information "would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the total mix of information
made available." 199
Having clarified the proper standard, the opinion turned to
whether allegations in the complaint relating to materiality passed
muster. First, the Court recognized that-under Iqbal-"facts"alleged
in a complaint must be "assumed to be true."200 At several points,
Justice Sotomayor's opinion used the word "plausible" (or variants
thereof),20 1 and acknowledged that a complaint must "allege 'enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' "202 But her
analysis of the plaintiffs complaint makes clear that plausibility is not
grounds for a court to second-guess allegations at the pleading phase.
To the contrary, Justice Sotomayor accepted as true all of the

197. Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. at 1318. The Matrixx plaintiffs had also alleged a failure to adequately
plead scienter, an issue which is explicitly governed by the heightened pleading standard imposed
by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). See id. at 1323-24 (noting that the
PSLRA requires the complaint to "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference
that the defendant acted with the required state of mind" (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A)
(2012)). The Court found that the complaint was sufficient on this issue as well. Id. at 1324-25.
198. Id. at 1314.
199. Id. at 1318 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
200. Id. at 1314 ("Respondents' consolidated amended complaint alleges the following facts,
which the courts below properly assumed to be true." (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662
(2009))).
201. See id. ("[Respondents have alleged facts plausibly suggesting that reasonable investors
would have viewed these particular reports as material."); id. at 1322 ("Assuming the complaint's
allegations to be true, as we must, Matrixx received information that plausibly indicated a reliable
causal link between Zicam and anosmia."); id. at 1322 n.12 ("[R] espondents' allegations plausibly
suggest that Dr. Jafek and Linschoten's conclusions were based on reliable evidence of a causal
link between Zicam and anosmia."); id. at 1322 n.13 ("[Tihe existence of the studies suggests a
plausible biological link between zinc and anosmia, which, in combination with the other
allegations, is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss."); id. at 1323 ("The information provided
to Matrixx by medical experts revealed a plausible causal relationship between Zicam Cold
Remedy and anosmia.").
202. Id. at 1322 n.12 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
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complaint's allegations regarding what information was communicated
to Matrixx, and what the relevant studies actually showed.
For example, she accepted without any further inquiry the
allegation that the studies "confirmed the toxicity of zinc," 20 3 which was
sufficient for materiality purposes even though the studies involved
zinc sulfate, rather than zinc gluconate, which was Zicam's active
ingredient. 2 4 In response to Matrixx's argument that the relevant
studies were unreliable "because they did not sufficiently rule out the
common cold as a cause for their patients' anosmia,"205 Justice
Sotomayor accepted without further inquiry the allegation that "in one
instance, a consumer who did not have a cold lost his sense of smell
after using Zicam." 20 6 At no point did she indicate that additional
allegations were required to plausibly suggest that the content of those
reports and studies was, in fact, as the plaintiffs alleged.
The Matrixx opinion, therefore, used plausibility in the classic
legal-sufficiency sense: accepting that everything happened as the
plaintiff described it, would it be legally permissible to conclude that
the withheld information would satisfy the materiality standard?
Matrixx first argued for a per se rule that adverse reports could be
material for securities fraud purposes only if they showed a statistically
significant relationship. 20 7 When the Court rejected that argument,
Matrixx made the more nuanced argument that the information
Matrixx allegedly knew (and failed to disclose) could not, as a matter of
law, have "significantly altered the total mix of information made
available."20 8 This is a legitimate argument to pursue-even at the
pleading phase. But the Court's rejection of that argument confirms
that the plausibility inquiry does not allow a court to refuse to accept a
complaint's allegations based on the judge's own perception of their
plausibility, or because the complaint fails to allege how the plaintiff
20 9
would ultimately prove those allegations as an evidentiary matter.
203. Id. at 1322 n.13.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1322 n.12.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1318; see also supra text accompanying note 199.
208. Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. at 1318 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
209. Indeed, the Supreme Court and countless lower courts have cautioned that whether a
misrepresentation qualifies as "material" is typically a question for the ultimate fact-finder, and
should not be determined as a matter of law. See, e.g., TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426
U.S. 438, 450 (1976):
The issue of materiality may be characterized as a mixed question of law and fact,
involving as it does the application of a legal standard to a particular set of facts. In
considering whether summary judgment on the issue is appropriate, we must bear in
mind that the underlying objective facts, which will often be free from dispute, are
merely the starting point for the ultimate determination of materiality. The
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C. Wood v. Moss
The next Supreme Court case on pleading standards came
nearly three years later. In March 2014, the Court decided Wood v.
Moss2 1 0-a Bivens case brought by plaintiffs who had been protesting
against President George W. Bush during his 2004 visit to a restaurant
in Oregon. 211 They sought monetary damages against several Secret
Service agents, alleging that the agents had engaged in
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination (in violation of the First
Amendment) by moving them farther away from the President than a
similar group that was expressing support for the President. 212 The
defendants invoked qualified immunity, and the Court agreed that the
plaintiffs' complaint should be dismissed on qualified immunity
grounds.213

Writing for the Court, Justice Ginsburg quoted Iqbal's
instruction that "courts 'must take all of the factual allegations in the
complaint as true,' but 'are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation.' ",214 She quoted Iqbal again for the
proposition that "the 'complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'
",215 Integral to her examination of the Wood complaint, however, was
the Court's substantive holding regarding qualified immunity. Justice
Ginsburg reasoned that given the state of the law at the time the agents
acted, the plaintiffs would have to show-at the very least-that "the
agents had no objectively reasonable security rationale" and had acted
"solely to inhibit the expression of disfavored views." 2 16 As long as an
objectively reasonable security rationale existed, the agents would be
entitled to qualified immunity even if it could be shown that viewpoint
discrimination also played a role.

determination requires delicate assessments of the inferences a "reasonable
shareholder" would draw from a given set of facts and the significance of those
inferences to him, and these assessments are peculiarly ones for the trier of fact.;
United States v. Fields, 592 F.2d 638, 649 (2d Cir. 1978) (considering but rejecting the argument
that the alleged misrepresentations were immaterial as a matter of law); S.E.C. v. Reys, 712 F.
Supp. 2d 1170, 1175 (W.D. Wash. 2010) (same); In re Aetna Inc. Sec. Litig., 34 F. Supp. 2d 935,
945 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (same).
210. 134 S. Ct. 2056 (2014).
211. Id. at 2061.
212. Id. at 2065.
213. Id. at 2065, 2070.
214. Id. at 2065 n.5 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
215. Id. at 2067 (quoting Ashcroft v. lqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
216. Id. at 2069 (emphasis added).
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This was a crucial premise for the Court's decision in Wood,
because the complaint itself included a map of the relevant area
revealing that "when the President reached the patio to dine, the
protesters, but not the supporters, were within weapons range of his
location. 2 17 It was this fact-and this fact alone-that led Justice
Ginsburg to conclude that "the protesters cannot plausibly urge that
the agents had no valid security reason to request or order their
218
eviction."
Wood did not, therefore, find that the allegation regarding the
agents' intent (impermissible viewpoint discrimination) was a
"conclusory" allegation that could be disregarded at the pleading phase.
Rather, the Court concluded that-because of the substantive law
governing the defendants' qualified immunity defense-the presence of
an objectively reasonable security rationale doomed the plaintiffs'
claims even if it could be shown that viewpoint discrimination also
motivated the agents' actions. 219 To be sure, one might disagree with
the Court's view of what First Amendment obligations were "clearly
established" at the time the agents acted. 220 But the Court's application
of the pleading standard was premised on that understanding.
Accordingly, the Court's reasoning in Wood simply reflected the longstanding pre-Twombly notion that plaintiffs can plead themselves out
of court if the complaint contains allegations that are fatal as a matter
of substantive law. 221 That was what led Justice Ginsburg to conclude
that the plaintiffs "cannot plausibly urge that the agents had no valid
'
security reason. "222
D. Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer
In June 2014, the Court decided Fifth Third Bancorp v.
Dudenhoeffer.223 The case focused primarily on the substantive law
governing ERISA duty-of-prudence claims. The unanimous opinion by
Justice Breyer began by rejecting the defendant's argument that
certain kinds of ERISA fiduciaries (those of an employee stock

217. Id. at 2070.
218. Id. (emphasis added).
219. Id. at 2069; see also supra text accompanying note 215.
220. Wood, 134 S. Ct. at 2068-69.
221. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text; see also Xechem, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co., 372 F.3d 899, 901 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that a plaintiff "pleads itself out of court"
when its complaint "admits all the ingredients of an impenetrable defense").
222. Wood, 134 S. Ct. at 2070.
223. 134 S. Ct. 2459 (2014).
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ownership plan, or ESOP) should enjoy a "presumption of prudence." 224
In remanding the case, however, Justice Breyer stated that a motion to
dismiss a duty-of-prudence claim "requires careful judicial
consideration of whether the complaint states a claim that the
defendant has acted imprudently. '225 Discussing some of the relevant
considerations, the Court clarified several aspects of the substantive
law governing ERISA duty-of-prudence claims depending on whether
the alleged lack of prudence was based on publicly available
information known to the fiduciary or inside information known to the
fiduciary.
With respect to the first category, the Court explained that
"allegations that a fiduciary should have recognized from publicly
available information alone that the market was over- or undervaluing
the stock are implausible as a general rule, at least in the absence of
special circumstances." 226 But the Court refused to rule out the
possibility that "a plaintiff could nonetheless plausibly allege
imprudence on the basis of publicly available information by pointing
to a special circumstance affecting the reliability of the market price as
an unbiased assessment of the security's value in light of all public
information that would make reliance on the market's valuation
227
imprudent."
With respect to the second category (where the use of inside
information might run afoul of securities laws), the Court wrote that "to
state a claim for breach of the duty of prudence on the basis of inside
information, a plaintiff must plausibly allege an alternative action that
the defendant could have taken that would have been consistent with
the securities laws and that a prudent fiduciary in the same
circumstances would not have viewed as more likely to harm the fund
than to help it."228
[Liower courts faced with such claims should also consider whether the complaint has
plausibly alleged that a prudent fiduciary in the defendant's position could not have
concluded that stopping purchases-which the market might take as a sign that insider
fiduciaries viewed the employer's stock as a bad investment-or publicly disclosing
negative information would do more harm than good to the fund by causing a drop in the
229
stock price and a concomitant drop in the value of the stock already held by the fund.

224. Id. at 2463; see also id. at 2470 ('The proposed presumption makes it impossible for a
plaintiff to state a duty-of-prudence claim, no matter how meritorious, unless the employer is in
very bad economic circumstances. Such a rule does not readily divide the plausible sheep from the
meritless goats.").
225. Id. at 2471.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 2472.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 2473.
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The Court's discussion of the potential role pleading motions
might play in the context of ESOP duty-of-prudence claims does not
suggest a fundamentally more restrictive approach to pleading. While
the Court indicates that certain things must be "plausibly alleged," the
only concrete "implausibility" examples the Court provides are theories
that fail as a matter of law. As a matter of law, holding stock is not
imprudent if selling that stock based on inside information would
violate securities laws. As a matter of law, holding or buying a
particular stock is not imprudent simply because the price of that stock
was dropping, because, absent special circumstances, fiduciaries may
prudently rely on the premise that the market price accurately reflects
publicly available information. As a matter of law, failing to stop new
purchases is not imprudent if doing so would have done more harm than
good, such as by signaling to the market that the stock is a bad
investment and leading to a drop in the stock price that would hurt
existing holdings. Where a complaint does allege a legally sufficient
theory, however, nothing in Fifth Third suggests that a court may
second-guess the underlying allegations based on a perceived lack of
230
plausibility.

230. As this Article was in its final editing stages, the Supreme Court issued a per curiam
decision in Amgen Inc. v. Harris, 136 S. Ct. 758 (2016), a case that had previously been remanded
to the Ninth Circuit for further consideration in light of Fifth Third. See Amgen Inc. v. Harris, 134
S. Ct. 2870 (2014). Prior to Fifth Third, the Ninth Circuit had found that the Amgen complaint
had adequately stated an ESOP duty-of-prudence claim based on the defendants' "continuing to
provide Amgen common stock as an investment alternative when they knew or should have known
that the stock was being sold at an artificially inflated price." See Harris v. Amgen, Inc., 770 F.3d
865 (9th Cir. 2014). After Fifth Third, on remand from the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit
"reiterated its conclusion that the complaint states such a claim." Amgen, 136 S. Ct. at 758; see
also Harrisv. Amgen, Inc., 788 F.3d 916, 919 (2014) ("The opinion filed on October 30, 2014, and
published at 770 F.3d 865, is hereby amended and replaced by the amended opinion filed
concurrently with this order."); id. at 929 ("On reconsideration in light of Fifth Third, we again
reverse the district court's dismissal."). The Supreme Court then found that the Ninth Circuit's
post-Fifth Third ruling had "failed to properly evaluate the complaint" because it "failed to assess
whether the complaint in its current form has plausibly alleged that a prudent fiduciary in the
same position could not have concluded that the alternative action would do more harm than good."
136 S. Ct. at 759 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court then stated, without
elaboration: "Having examined the complaint, the Court has not found sufficient facts and
allegations to state a claim for breach of the duty of prudence." Id. It did, however, "leaveU to the
District Court in the first instance whether the stockholders may amend it in order to adequately
plead a claim for breach of the duty of prudence guided by the standards provided in Fifth Third."
Id.
As with the Fifth Third decision itself, the Court did not specify in Amgen what would be
required to adequately allege that a particular alternative action would not have "done more harm
than good." Although the Court found the Amgen complaint to be insufficient, that complaint did
not contain any allegations regarding whether removing Amgen common stock from the list of
investment alternatives would have led to adverse consequences that might outweigh the benefits
to the plan participants. See Amended Complaint at
288-292, Harris v. Amgen, No. No. 2:07cv-05442-PSG-PLA (C.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2010), availableat 2010 WL 11401029. As described above,
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E. Johnson v. City of Shelby
Last Term, the Supreme Court issued a per curiam decision in
Johnson v. City of Shelby. 23 1 The primary issue in Johnson was whether
the district court had properly rejected the plaintiffs' due process claims
for failing to invoke 42 U.S.C. § 1983 explicitly in their complaint. The
Supreme Court held that a plaintiffs failure to cite § 1983 is not fatal:
"Federal pleading rules call for 'a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.
8(a)(2); they do not countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect
2 32
statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted."
The Johnson opinion then turned to Twombly and Iqbal. The
Court noted that Twombly and Iqbal did not resolve whether the
plaintiffs were required to cite § 1983 in their complaint, because
Twombly and Iqbal "concern the factual allegations a complaint must
contain to survive a motion to dismiss." 23 3 While Twombly and Iqbal
require a plaintiff to "plead facts sufficient to show that her claim has
substantive plausibility," the complaint in Johnson was "not deficient
in that regard" because the plaintiffs "stated simply, concisely, and
directly events that, they alleged, entitled them to damages from the
city." 234 It explained: "Having informed the city of the factual basis for
their complaint, they were required to do no more to stave off threshold
dismissal for want of an adequate statement of their claim. See Fed.
235
Rules Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2) and (3), (d)(1), (e)."
The Court's reasoning in Johnson confirms that the framework
set out in Twombly and Iqbal is consistent with a notice-pleading
approach. Iqbal itself recognized that nonconclusory allegations must

nonconclusory allegations on this question would have to be accepted as true; a judge may not
refuse to accept such allegations on plausibility grounds. See supra Sections I.A-C. Given the
Court's instruction that ESOP duty-of-prudence claims require that "a prudent fiduciary in the
same position could not have concluded that the alternative action would do more harm than good,"
Amgen, 136 S. Ct. at 759, it is not inconsistent with a regime that allows scrutiny of a complaint's
legal sufficiency to insist on allegations that-accepted as true-establish that requirement.
231. 135 S. Ct. 346 (2014).
232. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 346.
233. Id. at 347.
234. Id.
235. Id. The Court's citation to these particular aspects of Rule 8 is further endorsement of
the simplified, merits-based approach to pleading Charles Clark urged from the very beginning.
See supra notes 20-21. Rule 8(a)(2) & (a)(3), of course, set forth the basic pleading obligations: the
complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief' FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2), and "a demand for the relief sought." FED. R. CIv. P. 8(a)(3).
Rule 8(d) states: "Each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct. No technical form is
required." FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d). And Rule 8(e) makes clear that "[pileadings must be construed so
as to do justice." FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e).
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be accepted as true at the pleading phase, without any inquiry into
whether the truth of those allegations is plausibly suggested by other
allegations. It follows that plaintiffs comply with Rule 8(a)(2) as long as
they-like the Johnson plaintiffs-"stat[e] simply, concisely, and
directly events that, they allege[], entitle[] them to damages." 236
It is particularly noteworthy that the plaintiffs' claims in
Johnson were "that they were fired by the city's board of aldermen, not
for deficient performance, but because they brought to light criminal
activities of one of the aldermen."237 Such claims-like the claims at
issue in Iqbal and Swierkiewicz-hinge on the defendants' intent. The
Supreme Court's reasoning in Johnson, therefore, also supports the
view that Iqbal does not establish that an allegation is "conclusory"
simply because it alleges that a defendant acted with a certain state of
mind.2 38 Rather, such an allegation should be accepted as trueincluding its description of the defendant's intent-as long as it
provides a basic identification of the liability-generating events or
transactions. 23 9 Under the sort of "plausibility pleading" approach many
associate with Twombly and Iqbal, one would expect the Court to refuse
to accept such allegations unless further allegations plausibly suggest
their truth.

236. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 347. Johnson is similar in this regard to another per curiam
decision, Erickson v. Pardus,551 U.S. 89 (2007), that the Court decided shortly after Twombly but
prior to Iqbal. Erickson reversed the lower court's dismissal of a prisoner's Eighth Amendment
claim based on improper medical treatment. Id. at 94. The Court cited Twombly, yet made no
mention of plausibility. 551 U.S. at 93-94. Instead, Erickson stated:
Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only give the defendant fair notice
of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. In addition, when ruling on a
defendant's motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations
contained in the complaint.
Id. (citations, ellipses and internal quotation marks omitted). At the time, many held out hope that
Erickson was a conscious effort to limit the scope of Twombly-to reassure courts and litigants
that Twombly was an exceptional case but that the traditional notice-pleading approach to
pleading would continue to prevail in the mine run of litigation. Iqbal was viewed as rejecting this
theory, insofar as it made clear that Twombly reflects the pleading standard for all federal cases.
See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text. As described above, however, a proper reading of
both Twombly and Iqbal would not undermine traditional notice pleading. Erickson-like
Johnson-simplyconfirms what the TwomblylIqbal approach to pleading mandates as a matter of
logic: when nonconclusory allegations establish a meritorious cause of action, a complaint
necessarily survives a motion to dismiss without any inquiry into the plausibility of those
allegations. See supra notes 82, 131-133 and accompanying text.
237. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 346.
238. See supra notes 161-170 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 156-170 and accompanying text.
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F. Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers District Council
Construction Industry Pension Fund
Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers District Council Construction
Industry Pension Fund240 involved a false registration claim under § 11
of the 1933 Securities Act. As in Fifth Third, the Court in Omnicare
focused primarily on the governing substantive law, but it then
indicated the role that pleading standards might play on remand. The
plaintiffs in Omnicareasserted that the issuer's statement of an opinion
in a registration statement was actionable because the issuer had
"omitted to state facts necessary to make its opinion ... not
misleading." 241 Specifically, the Omnicare plaintiffs challenged the
with pharmaceutical
issuer's belief that its arrangements
242
manufacturers complied with federal and state law.
Writing for the majority, Justice Kagan rejected the defendant's
argument that an issuer's statement of opinion can never be grounds
for a § 11 "omission" claim. 243 Instead, she recognized: "[A] reasonable
investor may, depending on the circumstances, understand an opinion
statement to convey facts about ...the speaker's basis for holding that
view. And if the real facts are otherwise, but not provided, the opinion
statement will mislead its audience." 244 Put another way: "if a
registration statement omits material facts about the issuer's inquiry
into or knowledge concerning a statement of opinion, and if those facts
conflict with what a reasonable investor would take from the statement
'245
itself, then § 11's omissions clause creates liability.
Because a viable cause of action in this context exists "only when
an issuer's failure to include a material fact has rendered a published
statement misleading,"2 46 Justice Kagan emphasized (citing Iqbal) that
240. 135 S. Ct. 1318 (2015).
241. Id. at 1327; see also 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2012) (creating a cause of action if a registration
statement "omitted to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the
statements therein not misleading"). Omnicare also recognized that an opinion would violate § I l's
prohibition on making an "untrue statement of a material fact," 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a), if the speaker
did not hold the belief she professed, or if a supporting fact the speaker used to support her belief
was false. 135 S. Ct. at 1327 ("[L]iability under § 11's false-statement provision would follow ...
not only if the speaker did not hold the belief she professed but also if the supporting fact she
supplied were untrue."). The allegations in Omnicare did not support that theory. Id. (noting that
the plaintiffs "cannot avail themselves of either of those ways of demonstrating liability" because
the allegedly false sentences were "pure statements of opinion" and the plaintiffs "do not contest
that Omnicare's opinion was honestly held").
242. Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1323.
243. Id. at 1328-29.
244. Id. at 1328.
245. Id. at 1329.
246. Id. at 1332.
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"an investor must allege that kind of omission-and not merely by
means of conclusory assertions."2 47 That is, the complaint must "identify
particular (and material) facts going to the basis for the issuer's
opinion-facts about the inquiry the issuer did or did not conduct or the
knowledge it did or did not have-whose omission makes the opinion
statement at issue misleading to a reasonable person reading the
statement fairly and in context."248 Justice Kagan did not, however,
indicate that a court may refuse to accept the truth of such an allegation
at the pleading phase-the plaintiffs obligation is merely to "identify"
the omitted facts that form the basis for a claim that the issuer's
statement was misleading. 249 If the court is able to determine as a
matter of law that the omitted fact does not "show that Omnicare lacked
the basis for making those statements that a reasonable investor would
expect," 250 that is no different than the usual inquiry into legal
sufficiency that was traditionally proper fodder for motions to dismiss.
In remanding the case, Justice Kagan recognized that the
complaint in Omnicare had alleged "that an attorney had warned
Omnicare that a particular contract 'carried a heightened risk' of legal
exposure under anti-kickback laws." 251 However, she observed that
"[i]nsofar as the omitted fact at issue is the attorney's warning, that
inquiry entails consideration of such matters as the attorney's status
and expertise and other legal information available to Omnicare at the
time."25 2 Whether Omnicare's opinion was misleading may also depend
on "whatever facts Omnicare did provide about legal compliance, as well
as any other hedges, disclaimers, or qualifications it included in its
253
registration statement."
These considerations are consistent with examining the legal
sufficiency of a § 11 false registration claim at the pleading phase.
Depending on the allegations, a court might properly conclude as a
matter of law that the opinion was not misleading in light of other
information contained in the registration statement-not just "hedges,
disclaimers, or qualifications" but also, as in Omnicare, information in

247. Id. Accordingly, Justice Kagan explained: "The Funds' recitation of the statutory
language-that Omnicare 'omitted to state facts necessary to make the statements made not
misleading'-is not sufficient; neither is the Funds' conclusory allegation that Omnicare lacked
'reasonable grounds for the belief it stated respecting legal compliance." Id. at 1333.
248. Id. at 1332.
249. Id.; see also id. at 1333 ("[The plaintiff] cannot proceed without identifying one or more
facts left out of Omnicare's registration statement.").
250. Id. at 1333.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.

2016]

THE RISE AND FALL OFPLAUSIBILTYPLEADING?

379

the registration statement that there was a risk of legal exposure. 254 In
listing these considerations, Justice Kagan did not indicate that courts
should be undertaking a more rigorous inquiry than is ordinarily proper
to determine whether a claim fails as a matter of law. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has indicated that issues relating to such securities law
claims often present mixed questions of law and fact that are properly
255
left to the ultimate fact-finder.
G. Other Post-Iqbal Supreme Court References to PleadingStandards
There have been a few other post-Iqbal Supreme Court decisions
that allude to pleading standards without providing guidance as to their
content. 256 In Lexmark International,Inc. v. Static Control Components,
Inc.,257 for example, the Court cited Iqbal in holding that "proximate
cause" is an "element of a cause of action" under the Lanham Act, and
therefore "must be adequately alleged at the pleading stage in order for
the case to proceed." 258 The Court did not address, however, what was
254. Id. (noting that the registration statement itself indicated that "States had initiated
enforcement actions against drug manufacturers for giving rebates to pharmacies, that the
Federal Government had expressed concerns about the practice, and that the relevant laws could
be interpreted in the future in a manner that would harm Omnicare's business").
255. See supra note 209 and accompanying text. There is potentially some ambiguity in
Justice Kagan's statement that the lower court should "determine whether the omitted fact would
have been material to a reasonable investor-i.e., whether 'there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable investor would consider it important.' " 135 S. Ct. at 1333 (brackets omitted) (quoting
TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). This does not, however, support
the notion that the lower court must make a factual finding on the materiality question at the
pleading phase-particularly when Justice Kagan quotes the very Supreme Court decision
confirming that materiality is ordinarily a question for the ultimate fact-finder. See id. Properly
understood, this sentence from Omaicare simply indicates that-as in Matrixx-a lack of
materiality can be fatal at the pleading phase if the court can determine as a matter of law that a
statement is not material. See supra notes 207-209 and accompanying text.
256. There have also been occasional references to Twombly and Iqbal in concurring or
dissenting opinions by Supreme Court Justices. See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 279495 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that requiring a plaintiff to plead an element of a
claim "would not have meant imposing a heightened standard at all, but rather would have been
entirely consistent with traditional pleading requirements") (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678); FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2247 (2013)
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing Twornbly to support the point that antitrust actions entail
"famously burdensome discovery"); Pitre v. Cain, 131 S. Ct. 8, 9 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (faulting the court below for requiring the plaintiff "to produce 'evidence'
in support of his allegations before a responsive pleading was filed," and quoting Twombly for the
proposition that "when a complaint adequately states a claim, it may not be dismissed based on a
district court's assessment that the plaintiff will fail to find evidentiary support for his
allegations").
257. 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).
258. Id. at 1391 n.6; see also id. ("If a plaintiff's allegations, taken as true, are insufficient to
establish proximate causation, then the complaint must be dismissed; if they are sufficient, then
the plaintiff is entitled to an opportunity to prove them.").
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required to "adequately allegen" proximate cause, and it did not decide
the case on that basis.
In Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens,2 59 Justice
Ginsburg's majority opinion did not mention Twombly or Iqbal, but she
referred to the need to make "plausible" allegations in a notice of
removal. She framed the question presented in Dart Cherokee as
follows: "To assert the amount in controversy adequately in the removal
notice, does it suffice to allege the requisite amount plausibly, or must
the defendant incorporate into the notice of removal evidence
supporting the allegation?" 260 She concluded that "a defendant's notice
of removal need include only a plausible allegation that the amount in
controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold,"' 26 1 and "need not
contain evidentiary submissions."26 2 The Court did not discuss what
would qualify as a "plausible allegation" in this context, except to make
' 26 3
clear that it does not require "evidentiary submissions."

Accordingly, the Supreme Court's pleading decisions since
Twombly and Iqbal reflect an approach to pleading that is consistent
with the notice-pleading regime that characterized pre-Twombly case
law. As described above, this is also the best reading of the Twombly
and Iqbal decisions given both the logic of the pleading framework they
employ and what those decisions say-and do not say-about the
continued vitality of the Court's pre-Twombly precedents. 264 Whether
lower courts will adopt this understanding as they continue to wrestle
with federal pleading standards remains to be seen. But it is crucial to
recognize the important ways that the Court's post-Iqbal decisions
bolster, rather than undermine, basic aspects of notice pleading.
Otherwise the narrative that Twombly and Iqbal compel a more
restrictive approach to pleading may become further entrenched, to the

259. 135 S. Ct. 547, 549 (2014).
260. Id. at 551.
261. Id. at 554.
262. Id. at 551.
263. Id. The need for a "plausible" allegation regarding the amount in controversy might
simply reflect the understanding described in Part II, in which the plausibility prong of the
Twombly and Iqbal framework can operate as a mechanism for assessing legal sufficiency. See
supra notes 121-125 and accompanying text. Jurisdictional theories relevant to removal-just like
a claim's substantive merit-can also be challenged on legal-sufficiency grounds. See, e.g., St. Paul
Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-89 (1938) (noting that an amount-incontroversy allegation need not be accepted for jurisdictional purposes if it "appear[s] to a legal
certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal").
264. See supra Part II.
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IV. BEYOND PLAUSIBILITY PLEADING

The preceding Parts of this Article show that (1) Twombly and
Iqbal should not have been read to impose a plausibility-pleading
regime that was more restrictive than the long-standing noticepleading approach; and (2) recent Supreme Court decisions on pleading
confirm the view that Twombly and Iqbal should be applied in a way
that preserves notice pleading and pre-Twombly Supreme Court case
law. Confusion continues in the lower federal courts, however, and it is
worth addressing a few points that have arisen as courts have struggled
to make sense of Twombly and Iqbal.
As described in Part II, it is possible to reconcile the idea that
courts may disregard so-called "conclusory" allegations with the preTwombly notice-pleading approach. It is crucial, however, to
understand what makes an allegation a mere "legal conclusion" whose
truth need not be accepted at the pleading phase. A statement is not
conclusory for pleading purposes simply because it contains some
language that might be called conclusory in other contexts.2 65 The key
allegation in former Form 11, for example, must be accepted as true
even though one might call it conclusory to allege that the defendant
was driving "negligently."266 The allegation regarding the defendant's
discriminatory intent in Swierkiewicz must be accepted as true even
though one might call it conclusory to allege that Mr. Swierkiewicz's
"age and national origin were motivating factors in [the defendant's]
decision to terminate his employment." 267 These allegations are not
conclusory in the transactional sense-and therefore are sufficient to
give defendants fair notice-because they provide a basic identification
of the liability-generating events or transactions and the defendant's
role in those events or transactions. In addition to making sense of
Twombly and Iqbal,268 this approach gives effect to Rule 9(b)'s
instruction that "[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a
person's mind may be alleged generally. 2 69

265. See supra notes 161-173 and accompanying text.
266. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (describing Form 11). As discussed supra note
163, Form 11 remains instructive regarding federal pleading standards even though it and other
forms in the Federal Rules' Appendix were eliminated in December 2015. Former Form 11 (and
other forms relevant to pleading standards) are reproduced in Appendix B of this Article.
267. See supra note 35.
268. See supra notes 161-166 and accompanying text.
269. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b); see supra note 169.
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Post-Iqbal lower court decisions have been inconsistent when
handling these sorts of allegations. 2 70 There have, however, been some
encouraging examples of a more sensible approach-even before the
Supreme Court's more recent pleading decisions described in Part III.
In Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 271 for example, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit found that a complaint for discrimination under
the Fair Housing Act was sufficient because it "identifie[d] the type of
discrimination that [the plaintiff] thinks occurs (racial), by whom
(Citibank, through Skertich, the manager, and the outside appraisers
it used), and when (in connection with her effort in early 2009 to obtain
a home-equity loan). This is all that she needed to put in the
complaint." 272 Under the approach proposed in this Article, that is the
correct way to understand federal pleading standards after Twombly
and Iqbal, and it is consistent with both pre-Twombly and post-Iqbal
Supreme Court case law.
Another important question going forward is how much detail a
complaint must provide in describing the relevant events or
transactions in order to avoid being labeled conclusory. Notice pleading
may not be dead, but even Charles Clark-the chief drafter of the
original Federal Rules-recognized that some "content" must be given
to the word "notice."273 As Clark also recognized, notice "cannot be
defined so literally as to mean all the details of the parties' claims, or
else the rule is no advance. '2 74 This spirit should continue to inform
federal pleading standards. An allegation should not be treated as
conclusory-or as failing to provide fair notice-simply because it does
not provide "exact dates, times, locations, or which particular
employees or officers of an institutional or corporate party were
276
involved."275 As long as the complaint provides a "short and plain"
identification of what is alleged to have happened, there is no need for
courts to insist at the pleading phase on detail for detail's sake.

270. See Alex Reinert, PleadingAs Information-Forcing,75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1213 & nn.83-86 (citing cases).
271. 614 F.3d 400, 405 (7th Cir. 2010).
272. Id. at 404; see also Samovsky v. Nordstrom, Inc., 619 Fed. Appx. 547, 548 (Mem) (7th Cir.
Oct. 28, 2015) (reversing Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of an employment discrimination claim as
"premature" because " 'I was turned down for a job because of my race' is all a complaint has to
say").
273. See supra note 31 (citing Clark, supra note 20, at 460).
274. Clark, supra note 20, at 460.
275. Steinman, supra note 8, at 1343.
276. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
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Twombly and Iqbal, in fact, both recognize that Rule 8 does not require
277
"detailed factual allegations."
On this issue as well, courts since Iqbal have adopted conflicting
stances. One example has arisen in the context of Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) claims for failure to pay overtime wages. In Landers v.
Quality Communications, Inc.,278 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit recently found that it was insufficient for an FLSA
complaint to allege that the plaintiff had worked more than forty hours
per week but had not received overtime pay for those hours; rather, it
was necessary to identify the particular weeks overtime hours were not
paid. 279 Other courts, however, have held that such detail is not
28 0
required.
In determining what constitutes a "conclusory" allegation that
can be disregarded at the pleading phase, there is an unavoidable levelof-generality problem. Why, for example, is it sufficient for a plaintiff to
allege that the defendant in former Form 11 "negligently drove" rather
than to require the plaintiff to allege the particular aspect of the
defendant's driving that constituted negligence? On the other hand, if
the pleading standard tolerates "negligently drove," must it also
tolerate "tortiously drove," or "drove in a manner that makes the
defendant liable to the plaintiff?" These are difficult questions that may
elude perfectly coherent answers. It should be recognized, however, that
notice pleading was not immune from these level-of-generality
28
problems; again, some content must be given to the word "notice." '
One possible guidepost for resolving these issues may be the
substantive contours of the plaintiffs claim. To say that the defendant
drove "tortiously" may be impermissibly conclusory because the
substantive law itself delineates between different kinds of tortious
behavior. An intentional tort and a negligence tort are distinct legal
claims. They are subject to distinct legal standards that, at trial, would

277. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ("As the Court held in Twombly, the pleading
standard Rule 8 announces does not require 'detailed factual allegations'...." (quoting Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007))); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 ("[A] complaint
attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations ... .
278. 771 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 2014).
279. Id. at 644-46.
280. See, e.g., Pope v. Walgreen Co., No. 3:14-CV-439, 2015 WL 471006, at *5 (W.D. Tenn.
Feb. 4, 2015) ('To require the present plaintiffs to each specify in their complaint a particular week
in which they worked more than 40 hours without overtime pay would, again, be rigidly harsh and
inconsistent with Iqbal and Twombly.")
281. See supra note 31 (citing Clark, supra note 20, at 460).
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invite distinct instructions to the jury.28 2 On this view, an adverb like
"tortiously" is problematic because it glosses over these distinctions
with a catch-all legal conclusion. Such an approach would not be
insurmountable for plaintiffs, however. Even if the more general adverb
"tortiously" is too conclusory to be accepted as true in and of itself, a
plaintiff could still pursue relief under both a negligence theory and an
intentional tort theory. The Federal Rules unequivocally authorize
plaintiffs to plead claims in the alternative-even claims that are
23
inconsistent with one another.
Recognizing the substantive contours of particular claims can
also explain what might seem to be a tension between former Form 11
and the Court's post-Iqbal decisions in Fifth Third and Omnicare. If it
is sufficient to allege that the defendant "negligently" drove, how can
Fifth Third suggest that it is insufficient to allege simply that an ESOP
fiduciary "imprudently" bought or failed to sell company stock? And how
can Omnicare suggest that it is insufficient to allege simply that
Omnicare "lacked 'reasonable grounds"' for its belief?
One answer is that the Fifth Third and Omnicare decisions
clarify the substantive law in ways that establish new substantive
requirements for pursuing the claims at issue in those cases. After Fifth
Third, there is no longer a generic ERISA "imprudence" claim against
an ESOP fiduciary with respect to their decision to buy or hold their
own company's stock. Such claims depend on what information would
have alerted the fiduciary that its behavior was imprudent. If it was
public information, then the claim is legally insufficient unless-at the
very least-special circumstances reveal that the market price was
failing to account for that information. 28 4 If it was private information,
then the claim is legally insufficient unless taking the purportedly
prudent course of action would be consistent with securities laws
against insider trading and would not have harmed the fund in other
ways. 28 5 As in the car-accident example above, 28 6 a plaintiff might
pursue multiple theories-either together or in the alternative. But a
282. See, e.g., N.Y. PATTERN JURY INSTR.-CIVIL 2:10-2.12 (various instructions relating to
negligence); N.Y. PATTERN JURY INSTR.-CIVIL 3:1-3.3 (various instructions relating to intentional
torts).
283. See FED. R. CIv. P. 8(d)(2) ("A party may set out 2 or more statements of a claim or defense
alternatively or hypothetically, either in a single count or defense or in separate ones. If a party
makes alternative statements, the pleading is sufficient if any one of them is sufficient."); FED. R.
CIV. P. 8(d)(3) ("A party may state as many separate claims or defenses as it has, regardless of
consistency.").
284. See supra notes 226-227 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 228-229 and accompanying text; see also supra note 230 (describing the
Court's per curiam decision in Amgen, a follow-up to Fifth Third).
286. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
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blanket allegation that the defendant acted "imprudently" need not be
accepted as true.
Similarly, Omnicare means that there is no longer a generic
claim that the expression of an opinion in a registration statement was
a "false statement." Rather, there are distinct claims that (1) the
speaker did not actually hold the opinion stated in the registration
statement; (2) the speaker supported its opinion with a fact that was
false; or (3) a reasonable investor would understand the opinion to
convey facts about the speaker's basis for that opinion, but the real facts
are otherwise and are not provided in the statement. 28 7 Where-as in
Omnicare-aplaintiff pursues the third theory, it must at least identify
the facts whose omission make the statement of the opinion without
is free to pursue
those facts misleading. 28 And again, the plaintiff
2 9
claims.
alternative
as
liability
of
multiple theories
To survive the sort of legal-sufficiency inquiry that has always
been proper at the pleading phase, a complaint's "statement of the
claim" must have allegations that-accepted as true-cover each of the
substantive requirements articulated in Fifth Third and Omnicare.
Courts should be sensitive to how much detail is required when
describing the events underlying the plaintiffs claim, 290 but it is not
inconsistent with notice pleading to require allegations that, assuming
they are proven true, would make out a viable claim for relief. When
the Court states that such allegations must "plausibly" satisfy the
substantive requirements of a viable claim, this should be understood
to allow screening for legal insufficiency, as described above.2 9 1 The
plausibility inquiry should not permit a court to insist that the
complaint itemize subsidiary facts or evidence that the plaintiff plans
to use to support those allegations.
Finally, it is important to address the relationship between
pleading standards and discovery. There is, of course, an important

287. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 246-247 and accompanying text.
289. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 273-280 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 121-124 and accompanying text. This approach makes sense of the
Court's post-Iqbal statements that certain matters must be "plausibly" alleged. See, e.g., supra
notes 201-208, 214-222, 226-230 & 259-263 and accompanying text (discussing Matrixx, Wood,
Fifth Third, and Dart Cherokee). As the Court explained in Johnson, this inquiry focuses on a
claim's "substantive plausibility." Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 347. It is only if a complaint lacks a
substantively necessary requirement of a meritorious claim (or addresses it merely with a
"conclusory," "unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation," Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678) that a court should inquire whether the remaining allegations in a complaint "plausibly
suggest" its truth. See supra notes 118-120 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 83-87
and accompanying text (discussing Justice Kennedy's reasoning in Iqbal).
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practical relationship between the two. Because the pleading standard
determines whether the case will proceed to the discovery phase,
finding the proper balance between the costs and benefits of courtsupervised discovery has been a central feature of the pleading
debate. 292 Too lenient a pleading standard might impose unwarranted
discovery costs on innocent defendants, 293 yet too strict a pleading
standard could thwart meritorious claims by plaintiffs who cannot
satisfy the pleading standard without obtaining the information needed
294
to do so through the discovery process.
The Twombly and Iqbal opinions do contain a number of
comments regarding potential discovery burdens, although most are
simplistic and empirically unsupported. 295 Twombly and Iqbal do not,
however, employ a pleading standard that depends on a case-specific
assessment of the likely burdens or benefits of discovery. The Twombly
and Iqbal framework insists that nonconclusory allegations be accepted
as true, 296 regardless of whether it appears likely that supporting
evidence will be found during discovery: again, "a well-pleaded
complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof
of those facts is improbable, and 'that a recovery is very remote and
unlikely.' "297
292. See Steinman, supra note 8, at 1311 ("At the core of this consequentialist debate over
pleading standards is a struggle to balance the costs and benefits of pre-trial discovery.").
293. See id. ("If pleading standards are too lenient, plaintiffs without meritorious claims could
force innocent defendants to endure the costs of discovery and, perhaps, extract a nuisance
settlement from a defendant who would rather pay the plaintiff to make the case go away.").
294. See id. at 1311-12. This, of course, is the "Catch-22" described supra notes 94-95 and
accompanying text.
295. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685 (2009) (describing the need to avoid "disruptive
discovery" that "exacts heavy costs in terms of efficiency and expenditure of valuable time and
resources"); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) ("Thus, it is one thing to be
cautious before dismissing an antitrust complaint in advance of discovery, but quite another to
forget that proceeding to antitrust discovery can be expensive." (citations omitted)); id. at 559
("[Tihe threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle."). In fact,
empirical studies confirm that disproportionately burdensome discovery is the rare exception in
federal court. See Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal
Civil Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765, 773 (2010).
296. See supra Part II.
297. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). This
notion is not undermined by Twombly's comment that the plausibility inquiry "calls for enough
fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement." Id.
As discussed supra notes 157-160 and accompanying text, Twombly undertook the plausibility
inquiry only because the complaint had failed to make an "independent allegation of actual
agreement." Id. at 564 (emphasis added). Had the complaint provided such an "independent
allegation of actual agreement," it would have qualified as a nonconclusory allegation that must
be accepted as true. See id. That would have rendered the plausibility inquiry-and any need for
additional "fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal
agreement"-unnecessary. Id. at 556. This is confirmed not only by the logic of the Twombly
opinion itself, but also by Twombly's reliance on Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S.
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Even on Twombly and Iqbal's own terms, the pleading standard
is not an invitation for courts to make off-the-cuff assessments about
discovery burdens based solely on the allegations in the complaint.
Discovery expense is a valid concern, but it is one that is already
accounted for in the discovery rules themselves. The Federal Rules
explicitly state that discovery will not be permitted unless it is
"proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the
issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties'
relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the
importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the
burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely
benefit." 298 Procedurally, parties can request ex ante limits on the kind,
quantity, and sequence of discovery, and they can also make a-la-carte
objections to particular discovery requests at the time those requests
are made. 299 The structure of the discovery rules ensures that parties
are never forced to comply with an unduly burdensome discovery
request without an opportunity for the court to consider whether the
request is proper.
Indeed, there are functional reasons to insist that this inquiry
occur as part of the discovery process rather than in the context of a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion allows a defendant to
obtain dismissal of the complaint without even having to deny the truth
of the plaintiffs allegations. 30 0 A Rule 12(b)(6) motion merely targets
336 (2005), for the proposition that a complaint should not survive the pleading phase if there is
no "reasonably founded hope that the [discovery] process will reveal relevant evidence." Id. at 55960 (quoting Dura, 544 U.S. at 347). For Dura, there would have been such "reasonably founded
hope" as long as the complaint had provided "some indication of the loss and the causal connection
that the plaintiff has in mind." Dura, 544 U.S. at 347 (emphasis added). All Dura required, then,
was a mere articulation of events connecting the defendant's conduct to the loss suffered by the
plaintiff-not some affirmative indication that supporting evidence would, in fact, be found. See
Steinman, supra note 8, at 1334-35 (describing Dura as consistent with a transactional approach
to pleading).
298. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Prior to the 2015 amendments to Rule 26, proportionality
considerations were addressed in Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). The 2015 amendments "rearranged" the
previously codified proportionality considerations "slightly" and added an explicit reference to "the
parties' relative access to relevant information." FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee's note to
2015 amendment ("The considerations that bear on proportionality are moved from present Rule
26(b)(2)(C)(iii), slightly rearranged and with one addition.").
299. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(2)(F) (authorizing the court to "take appropriate action on .
controlling and scheduling discovery"); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) (authorizing the court to order
limitations on discovery); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1) ("A party or any person from whom discovery is
sought may move for a protective order."); FED. R. CIv. P. 37 (describing the process for resolving
discovery disputes).
300. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(a)-(b) (authorizing the defense of "failure to state a claim" to be
asserted "by motion" prior to having to serve an answer); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 572
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the Twombly complaint was dismissed "without so much as
requiring [the defendants] to file an answer denying that they entered into any agreement").
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whether the complaint adequately states a claim. Therefore, the
defendant can file such a motion free from Rule 8's obligation to "admit
or deny the allegations asserted against it by an opposing party,"30 1 as
well as Rule 1I's obligation that a defendant may deny such allegations
only when an "inquiry reasonable under the circumstances" reveals
that "denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence" (or
at least "are reasonably based on belief or lack of information"). 30 2 What
difference does this make? If information surfaces that confirms the
plaintiffs allegations after a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, it is unlikely that
there will be any potential recourse against the defendant. But if the
defendant improperly denies an allegation in its answer or improperly
withholds relevant information during the discovery process, and this
ultimately leads to a judgment against the plaintiff (either at summary
30 3
judgment or at trial), Rule 60(b) can be used to reopen the case.
Even if a court is concerned about discovery burdens, it is hard
to see why at least some basic discovery is not warranted in all cases
where the complaint provides a simple transactional narrative that, if
accepted as true, would establish a legally viable claim. Narrowly
tailored discovery-some number of relevant interrogatories, requests
for identifiable, relevant documents, and depositions of key witnesseswould admittedly impose some litigation costs on the defendant. But so
30 4
does litigation over pleading sufficiency at the Rule 12(b)(6) phase,
which can invite amended complaints that are then followed by
additional Rule 12(b)(6) motions challenging the sufficiency of those
pleadings. 30 5 Defendants are often happy to incur those costs if the
potential result is a pre-answer dismissal of the complaint. For the
system as a whole, however, it seems better to have pre-trial activity
focus on the discovery of relevant information-and a direct assessment
of what type and quantity of discovery is warranted-than on pre301.

FED. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(1)(B).

302.

FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(4).

303. See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(3) ("[Tihe court may relieve a party or its legal representative
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: ... (3) fraud (whether
previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party.");
see, e.g., Summers v. Howard Univ., 374 F.3d 1188, 1193 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ("As several circuits have
held, failure to disclose or produce materials requested in discovery can constitute misconduct
within the purview of Rule 60(b)(3)." (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
304. See Steinman, supra note 8, at 1355:
[T]he argument that a stricter pleading standard is needed to control discovery costs
overlooks the costs that heightened pleading standards can add to the pleadings phase
itself.... [A] stricter pleading standard can encourage costly, time-consuming litigation
over pleading sufficiency. The perception that Twombly and Iqbal raised the bar for
federal pleading standards seems to have had precisely this effect.
305. See, e.g., Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 133-34 (3d Cir. 2010) (considering
whether the plaintiffs Third Amended Complaint passes muster under Twombly and Iqbal).
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answer briefs and motions scrutinizing every jot and tittle of the
plaintiffs complaint. As Charles Clark observed: "we cannot expect the
proof of the case to be made through the pleadings" because "such proof
3°
is really not their function." 6
CONCLUSION

From the original drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to the twenty-first century critics of Twombly and Iqbal,
scholars have long recognized the importance of pleading standards to
an effective, well-functioning system of civil justice. The initial pleading
is the key to the courthouse door. A claim that cannot survive the
pleading phase is effectively no claim at all.
This realization drove the federal courts' approach to pleading
during the first seven decades of the Federal Rules. Although Twombly
and Iqbal disrupted the traditional framework, they need not be
interpreted in a way that imposes a newly restrictive pleading
standard. The Twombly and Iqbal decisions had many flaws, but it
was-and still is-possible to read them in a way that would retain the
notice-pleading approach set forth in the text of the Federal Rules and
confirmed by pre-Twombly case law. More recent Supreme Court
decisions refute the conventional wisdom that Twombly and Iqbal
installed a plausibility-pleading regime that gives courts greater power
to second-guess a plaintiffs allegations at the pre-answer motion-todismiss stage. This is a positive development, but it may have little
impact unless it receives the same attention that accompanied the
Twombly and Iqbal decisions themselves.
APPENDIX A: MOST FREQUENTLY CITED
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

The following chart lists the one hundred most-frequently cited
Supreme Court decisions of all time, in terms of citations by federal
courts and tribunals. The citation counts are based on the Shepard's
citation service primary database as of September 9, 2015.307

306. Charles E. Clark, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Last PhaseUnderlyingPhilosophy Embodied in Some of the Basic Provisionsof tke New Procedure,23 A.B.A.
J. 976, 977 (1937).
307. Reprinted with the permission of LexisNexis. Sincere thanks to Frear Simons and
Praveen Nuthakki for compiling this information.
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APPENDIX B: SELECTED FORMS FROM THE FEDERAL RULES'
APPENDIX (As OF NOv. 30, 2015)

Until December 1, 2015, the Appendix to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure contained a number of forms that-according to the
now-abrogated Rule 84-"suffice under these rules and illustrate the
simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate."30 8 The Appendix
has now been eliminated, 30 9 but for the reasons set forth earlier the
3 10
forms relating to pleading standards should remain relevant.
Because the abrogated forms may be harder to find as electronic sources
of information are updated to reflect the current Rules, several of the
311
forms relevant to pleading standards are reproduced here.

308. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
309. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
310. See supra note 163.
311. Note that all of the form complaints reproduced here begin with a Caption (a sample of
which previously appeared in Form 1), and a Statement of Jurisdiction (a sample of which
previously appeared in Form 7). They conclude with the date and a signature (a sample of which
previously appeared in Form 2).
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Form 10
COMPLAINT TO RECOVER A SUM CERTAIN
1. (Statement of Jurisdiction-See Form 7.)
(Use one or more of the following as appropriate
include a demand for judgment.)

and

(a)

On a PromissoryNote
2. On date, the defendant executed and delivered a note
with interest
promising to pay the plaintiff on date the sum of $__
at the rate of __ percent. A copy of the note [is attached as Exhibit A]
[is summarized as follows: _
.]
3. The defendant has not paid the amount owed.
(b)

On an Account
2. The defendant owes the plaintiff $__
account set out in Exhibit A.

according to the

(c)

For Goods Sold and Delivered
2. The defendant owes the plaintiff $
for goods sold and
delivered by the plaintiff to the defendant from date to date.
(d)

For Money Lent
2. The defendant owes the plaintiff $.
the plaintiff to the defendant on date.

for money lent by

(e)

For Money Paid by Mistake
2. The defendant owes the plaintiff $__
for money paid by
mistake to the defendant on date under these circumstances: describe
with particularityin accordance with Rule 9(b).
(f) For Money Had and Received
2. The defendant owes the plaintiff $
for money that was
received from name on date to be paid by the defendant to the plaintiff.
Demand for Judgment
Therefore, the plaintiff demands judgment against the
defendant for $
, plus interest and costs.
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Form 11
COMPLAINT FOR NEGLIGENCE
1. (Statement of Jurisdiction-See Form 7.)
2. On date, at place, the defendant negligently drove a motor
vehicle against the plaintiff.
3. As a result, the plaintiff was physically injured, lost wages or
income, suffered physical and mental pain, and incurred medical
.
expenses of $_
Therefore, the plaintiff demands judgment against the
, plus costs.
defendant for $
Form 12
COMPLAINT FOR NEGLIGENCE WHEN THE PLAINTIFF DOES
NOT KNOW WHO IS RESPONSIBLE
1. (Statement of Jurisdiction-See Form 7.)
2. On date, at place, defendant name or defendant name or both
of them willfully or recklessly or negligently drove, or caused to be
driven, a motor vehicle against the plaintiff.
3. As a result, the plaintiff was physically injured, lost wages or
income, suffered mental and physical pain, and incurred medical
expenses of $__
Therefore, the plaintiff demands judgment against one or both
plus costs.
-,
defendants for $
Form 13
COMPLAINT FOR NEGLIGENCE UNDER THE FEDERAL
EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT
1. (Statement of Jurisdiction-See Form 7.)
2. At the times below, the defendant owned and operated in
interstate commerce a railroad line that passed through a tunnel
located at
3. On date, the plaintiff was working to repair and enlarge the
tunnel to make it convenient and safe for use in interstate commerce.
4. During this work, the defendant, as the employer, negligently
put the plaintiff to work in a section of the tunnel that the defendant
had left unprotected and unsupported.
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5. The defendant's negligence caused the plaintiff to be injured
by a rock that fell from an unsupported portion of the tunnel.
6. As a result, the plaintiff was physically injured, lost wages or
income, suffered mental and physical pain, and incurred medical
.
expenses of $_
Therefore, the plaintiff demands judgment against the
, and costs.
defendant for $
Form 14
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES UNDER THE
MERCHANT MARINE ACT
1. (Statement of Jurisdiction-See Form 7.)
2. At the times below, the defendant owned and operated the
vessel name and used it to transport cargo for hire by water in
interstate and foreign commerce.
3. On date, at place, the defendant hired the plaintiff under
to
seamen's articles of customary form for a voyage from
a month and found, which is
and return at a wage of $
equal to a shore worker's wage of $
a month.
4. On date, the vessel was at sea on the return voyage. (Describe
the weather and the condition of the vessel.)
5. (Describe as in Form 11 the defendant's negligent conduct.)
6. As a result of the defendant's negligent conduct and the
unseaworthiness of the vessel, the plaintiff was physically injured, has
been incapable of any gainful activity, suffered mental and physical
pain, and has incurred medical expenses of $
.
Therefore, the plaintiff demands judgment against the
, plus costs.
defendant for $
Form 15
COMPLAINT FOR THE CONVERSION OF PROPERTY
1. (Statement of Jurisdiction-See Form 7.)
2. On date, at place, the defendant converted to the defendant's
own use property owned by the plaintiff. The property converted
consists of describe.
3. The property is worth $__
Therefore, the plaintiff demands judgment against the
defendant for $
, plus costs.
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Form 17
COMPLAINT FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF A CONTRACT
TO CONVEY LAND
1. (Statement of Jurisdiction-See Form 7.)
2. On date, the parties agreed to the contract [attached as
Exhibit A] [summarize the contract].
3. As agreed, the plaintiff tendered the purchase price and
requested a conveyance of the land, but the defendant refused to accept
the money or make a conveyance.
4. The plaintiff now offers to pay the purchase price.
Therefore, the plaintiff demands that:
(a) the defendant be required to specifically perform the
agreement and pay damages of $
, plus interest and costs, or
(b) if specific performance is not ordered, the defendant be
required to pay damages of $
, plus interest and costs.
Form 18
COMPLAINT FOR PATENT INFRINGEMENT
1. (Statement of Jurisdiction-See Form 7.)
2. On date, United States Letters Patent No.
were
issued to the plaintiff for an invention in an electric motor. The plaintiff
owned the patent throughout the period of the defendant's infringing
acts and still owns the patent.
3. The defendant has infringed and is still infringing the Letters
Patent by making, selling, and using electric motors that embody the
patented invention, and the defendant will continue to do so unless
enjoined by this court.
4. The plaintiff has complied with the statutory requirement of
placing a notice of the Letters Patent on all electric motors it
manufactures and sells and has given the defendant written notice of
the infringement.
Therefore, the plaintiff demands:
(a) a preliminary and final injunction against the continuing
infringement;
(b) an accounting for damages; and
(c) interest and costs.
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Form 19
COMPLAINT FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION
1. (Statement of Jurisdiction-See Form 7.)
2. Before date, the plaintiff, a United States citizen, wrote a book
entitled
3. The book is an original work that may be copyrighted under
United States law. A copy of the book is attached as Exhibit A.
4. Between date and date, the plaintiff applied to the copyright
office and received a certificate of registration dated
and
identified as date, class, number.
5. Since date, the plaintiff has either published or licensed for
publication all copies of the book in compliance with the copyright laws
and has remained the sole owner of the copyright.
6. After the copyright was issued, the defendant infringed the
copyright by publishing and selling a book entitled
, which was
copied largely from the plaintiffs book. A copy of the defendant's book
is attached as Exhibit B.
7. The plaintiff has notified the defendant in writing of the
infringement.
8. The defendant continues to infringe the copyright by
continuing to publish and sell the infringing book in violation of the
copyright, and further has engaged in unfair trade practices and unfair
competition in connection with its publication and sale of the infringing
book, thus causing irreparable damage.
Therefore, the plaintiff demands that:
(a) until this case is decided the defendant and the defendant's
agents be enjoined from disposing of any copies of the defendant's book
by sale or otherwise;
(b) the defendant account for and pay as damages to the plaintiff
all profits and advantages gained from unfair trade practices and unfair
competition in selling the defendant's book, and all profits and
advantages gained from infringing the plaintiffs copyright (but no less
than the statutory minimum);
(c) the defendant deliver for impoundment all copies of the book
in the defendant's possession or control and deliver for destruction all
infringing copies and all plates, molds, and other materials for making
infringing copies;
(d) the defendant pay the plaintiff interest, costs, and reasonable
attorney's fees; and
(e) the plaintiff be awarded any other just relief.
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Form 21
COMPLAINT ON A CLAIM FOR A DEBT AND TO SET ASIDE A
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE UNDER RULE 18(B)
1. (Statement of Jurisdiction-See Form 7.)
2. On date, defendant name signed a note promising to pay to
with interest at the rate of__
the plaintiff on date the sum of $__
percent. [The pleader may, but need not, attach a copy or plead the note
verbatim.]
3. Defendant name owes the plaintiff the amount of the note and
interest.
4. On date, defendant name conveyed all defendant's real and
personal property if less than all, describe it fully to defendant name for
the purpose of defrauding the plaintiff and hindering or delaying the
collection of the debt.
Therefore, the plaintiff demands that:
, plus costs, be entered against
(a) judgment for $
defendant(s) name(s); and
(b) the conveyance to defendant name be declared void and any
judgment granted be made a lien on the property.

